Jeffrey Lapinske v. City of Grand Haven, Mich., 21-1309

Background

In 1913 Martha Duncan conveyed ~40 acres to trustees for "DUNCAN PARK," via a Trust Deed that (a) required the City to adopt a matching ordinance, (b) restricted use to a public park, and (c) contained reverter language (Third and Eighth Sections) plus a Ninth Section authorizing courts to appoint a successor Commission if the Commission ceased to exist.
Grand Haven adopted the 1913 ordinance and the park operated as Duncan Park for decades.
After an 2009 sledding death and ensuing litigation, the City adopted a revised ordinance in 2013 changing Commission structure; the three sitting trustees resigned and no successors were appointed.
In 2015 the Ottawa County Probate Court reformed the trust and appointed the City as sole trustee; Michigan appellate courts affirmed aspects of the Nash litigation holding the trust valid.
Duncan’s heirs sued in federal court (2019), arguing the 2013 ordinance and subsequent reformation triggered the Trust Deed’s reverter; the district court granted summary judgment to the City and Michigan Attorney General, and the Sixth Circuit affirmed.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Did the 2013 ordinance or subsequent reformation trigger the Trust Deed's reverter provisions?	Heirs: Repeal/replacement of the 1913 ordinance and administrative changes violated the deed’s conditions and activated reverter.	City/AG: The deed must be read as a whole; Ninth Section contemplates Commission changes and court-ordered modification, so no reverter.	Held for City/AG: No reverter triggered because the deed's Ninth Section permits judicial modification to preserve the park.
Did the trustees' resignation constitute "neglect or refuse to carry out in good faith" so as to trigger reverter?	Heirs: Trustee resignations evidence failure to carry out terms, triggering reverter.	City/AG: Land continued to be held and used as a public park; resignation alone did not meet both conjunctive reverter conditions.	Held for City/AG: Conditions for reverter not met—park continued as public and the conjunctive standard applies.
Does the Eighth Section's language that repeal of the ordinance "shall render this Deed null and void" invalidate the trust?	Heirs: Repeal/alteration of the ordinance made the deed null and void, allowing heirs to reclaim property.	City/AG: Eighth must be read with Ninth; settlor foresaw changes and provided judicial remedy to preserve charitable intent.	Held for City/AG: Eighth cannot be read in isolation; Ninth supplies the mechanism to modify the Commission and preserve the trust.
Even if reverter triggered, may courts apply cy pres under M.C.L. 700.7413 to avoid reverter?	Heirs: Cy pres inapplicable; trust not impossible/impracticable and statute rooted in UTC §413 doesn't apply here.	City/AG: Cy pres statute codifies common-law doctrine; more than 50 years have passed and settlor is dead, so cy pres can prevent reverter.	Held for City/AG: Cy pres would apply—reverter to noncharitable beneficiaries is barred because settlor dead and >50 years elapsed, so court may modify to effect general charitable intent.

Key Cases Cited

Nash v. Duncan Park Comm’n, 848 N.W.2d 435 (Mich. Ct. App. 2014) (held Trust Deed created a valid charitable trust and trustees held fee simple title)
Nash v. Duncan Park Comm’n, 862 N.W.2d 417 (Mich. 2015) (Michigan Supreme Court disposition leaving key parts of appellate decision intact)
Klapp v. United Ins. Grp. Agency, Inc., 663 N.W.2d 447 (Mich. 2003) (contracts/deeds must be read as a whole; give effect to every term)
In re Kostin, 748 N.W.2d 583 (Mich. Ct. App. 2008) (settlor's intent governs trust interpretation)
Auto Owners Ins. Co. v. Seils, 871 N.W.2d 530 (Mich. 2015) (contractual terms construed in context and read with the contract as a whole)
In re Rood's Est., 200 N.W.2d 728 (Mich. Ct. App. 1972) (explaining cy pres as a device to effectuate general charitable intent)
La Fond v. City of Detroit, 98 N.W.2d 530 (Mich. 1959) (cy pres cannot be used to defeat unambiguous testamentary language)
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986) (summary judgment standard)
Solo v. United Parcel Serv. Co., 819 F.3d 788 (6th Cir. 2016) (contracts interpreted by plain and ordinary meaning)