Jeffrey Ashley v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)
49A02-1512-CR-2214
| Ind. Ct. App. | Oct 3, 2016Background
- On June 18, 2014, 14-year-old T.W. was approached multiple times by Jeffrey Ashley in his vehicle; on the third approach she saw a handgun and, fearing for her safety, entered his car.
- Ashley locked the doors, parked, and demanded T.W. touch his penis and perform oral sex; when she resisted he grabbed her arm, forced her hand and pulled her head to his genitals until he ejaculated.
- T.W. was dropped off near her grandmother’s home and given $40; Ashley later acknowledged in a jail phone call that T.W. performed oral sex on him.
- The State charged multiple counts including criminal deviate conduct, sexual misconduct with a minor, criminal confinement, and sexual battery; the jury convicted on Count II (criminal deviate conduct, B felony), Count IV (sexual misconduct with a minor, B felony), Count VI (criminal confinement, D felony), and Count VIII (sexual battery, D felony), and acquitted on several firearm-enhanced counts.
- The trial court imposed an aggregate executed sentence of 16 years with 4 years suspended to probation.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (State) | Defendant's Argument (Ashley) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sufficiency — force/imminent threat for criminal deviate conduct and sexual battery | Evidence (gun visible, locked doors, grabbing, pulling, forcing oral sex) shows T.W. was compelled by force or threat | Evidence insufficient: no violent physical force shown to compel submission | Affirmed — victim’s subjective perception and circumstantial evidence (gun, locked doors, grabbing/pulling) suffice to show force or imminent threat |
| Double jeopardy (actual evidence test) — convictions for criminal deviate conduct and sexual battery | Charging info, jury instructions, and State’s arguments treated the acts as distinct: one count for forced oral sex, the other for forced touching | Convictions impermissibly duplicate because same facts (forced oral sex) could establish both offenses | Affirmed — no reasonable possibility jury used identical evidentiary facts for both convictions; State argued separate factual bases (forced oral sex vs. forced touching) |
Key Cases Cited
- Drane v. State, 867 N.E.2d 144 (Ind. 2007) (standard for sufficiency review)
- McHenry v. State, 820 N.E.2d 124 (Ind. 2005) (appellate deference to jury on credibility)
- Filice v. State, 886 N.E.2d 24 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (victim’s perception controls force analysis in sexual-offense cases)
- Frazier v. State, 988 N.E.2d 1257 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (force inference from circumstances in sexual battery cases)
- Riggs v. State, 508 N.E.2d 1271 (Ind. 1987) (uncorroborated victim testimony may support conviction)
- Harvey v. State, 719 N.E.2d 406 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999) (any amount of force can constitute confinement)
- McCarter v. State, 961 N.E.2d 43 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (force may be implied from circumstances for confinement)
- Cross v. State, 15 N.E.3d 569 (Ind. 2014) (Indiana double jeopardy framework)
- Richardson v. State, 717 N.E.2d 32 (Ind. 1999) (establishing statutory-element and actual-evidence double jeopardy tests)
- Garrett v. State, 992 N.E.2d 710 (Ind. 2013) (application of actual-evidence test; evaluate jury perspective)
- Spivey v. State, 761 N.E.2d 831 (Ind. 2002) (actual-evidence test explanation)
- Lee v. State, 892 N.E.2d 1231 (Ind. 2008) (requiring more than a logical possibility to find double jeopardy violation)