236 Cal. App. 4th 1175
Cal. Ct. App.2015Background
- Jefferson Street Ventures owned a 26.85-acre vacant parcel adjacent to I-10 and applied in 2005 to develop a retail shopping center (the PMP) covering the whole parcel.
- The City of Indio was planning an I-10/Jefferson Street interchange; the City selected a preferred alignment (Alternative 1) in 2007 that would require acquiring ~9 acres, plus a ~2-acre temporary no-build area—about 11 acres total.
- In 2007 the City approved Jefferson’s PMP but conditioned approval on revising the building envelope to exclude the Alternative 1 acreage and a 2.1-acre temporary no-build area (i.e., prohibiting development of ~11 acres) until the interchange environmental approvals and right-of-way acquisitions were complete.
- Jefferson sued (petition for writ of administrative mandamus joined with inverse condemnation claims), arguing the conditioned approval was an uncompensated taking and unlawful exaction; the trial court denied the writ and later granted the City judgment on the pleadings on the inverse condemnation counts.
- While appeal was pending, the County assumed responsibility for the interchange and filed a direct condemnation action to acquire portions of Jefferson’s land; the appellate court took judicial notice of the cooperative agreement and the County’s condemnation complaint.
- The Court of Appeal reversed: it held the City’s condition constituted a de facto (temporary) taking of the 11 acres reserved for the interchange and remanded for proceedings to determine just compensation, advising consolidation with the pending condemnation actions to avoid duplicative recovery.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether conditioning PMP approval on leaving ~11 acres undeveloped constituted an uncompensated taking | The City’s condition effectively "banked" land for future condemnation, depriving Jefferson of all beneficial use of that acreage and thus was a de facto taking requiring compensation | The condition left 17 acres developable, so it did not deprive Jefferson of all economically viable use; federal procedural constraints justified delaying acquisition | Court held the restriction on the identified ~11 acres was a de facto taking of that portion and unconstitutional without compensation; writ should have been granted |
| Whether Jefferson’s mandamus petition was the proper vehicle (ripeness/exhaustion) before pursuing inverse condemnation | Mandamus was proper under Hensler to force a prepayment judicial determination and give the City opportunity to rescind | City argued ripeness/exhaustion problems because Jefferson never submitted a 17-acre site plan; raised on appeal | Court treated mandamus as the correct route and found the agency action reviewable; City’s ripeness argument waived for lack of developed analysis |
| Scope of the taking — entire parcel vs. carved-out acreage | Jefferson argued the conditioned restriction effectively made any development uncertain and effected a taking of the entire parcel | City argued the parcel must be considered as a whole; only a portion was restricted and remaining 17 acres remained viable | Court found the taking limited to the clearly delineated Alternative 1 acreage and Temporary No-Build Area, not the entire 26.85-acre parcel |
| Effect of pending County direct condemnation on this appeal (mootness / duplication) | Jefferson stressed that direct condemnation does not moot the appellate remedy and asked for coordination to prevent duplicative damages | City argued direct condemnation rendered the writ/action moot because just compensation would be obtained there | Court held the direct condemnation did not render this appeal moot and remanded; directed trial court to consider consolidating actions to avoid duplicate recoveries |
Key Cases Cited
- Hensler v. City of Glendale, 8 Cal.4th 1 (Cal. 1994) (property owner must first seek administrative mandamus to allow agency chance to rescind or modify before pursuing inverse condemnation)
- Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528 (U.S. 2005) (regulatory takings analysis focuses on burden to reasonable investment-backed expectations and economic impact)
- Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (U.S. 1978) (multi-factor test for non-categorical regulatory takings)
- Nollan v. California Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825 (U.S. 1987) (exaction must have essential nexus to governmental interest)
- Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (U.S. 1994) (exaction must be roughly proportional to the impact)
- Diversified Properties Co. III v. Dept. of Transportation, 14 Cal.App.4th 429 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993) (governmental ‘‘land banking’’ and cooperation with local development restrictions can create a de facto taking of reserved rights-of-way)
- Jones v. People ex rel. Dept. of Transportation, 22 Cal.3d 144 (Cal. 1978) (designation of land for future acquisition that results in denial of required land-use approvals can be a taking)
- Klopping v. City of Whittier, 8 Cal.3d 39 (Cal. 1972) (distinguishing precondemnation damages from de facto takings; timing/valuation rules)
- Twain Harte Assocs., Ltd. v. County of Tuolumne, 217 Cal.App.3d 71 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990) (taking analysis can focus on the specifically restricted portion of a parcel when the government has carved it out)