Jefferson County Vision, Inc. v. City of Ranson and Roxul USA, Inc.
20-0789
| W. Va. | Oct 6, 2021Background
- Jefferson County Vision (nonprofit) and nearby landowners Sutherland and Adams sued the City of Ranson after Ranson rezoned the Jefferson Orchards property and adopted a stack-height exemption; Rockwool planned a stone-wool plant on the site and intervened.
- In 2017 Ranson adopted two ordinances: a Stack Ordinance exempting industrial smokestacks from height limits and an Industrial District Ordinance rezoning the property to permit heavy industrial uses.
- Petitioners filed suit in December 2018 asserting only procedural challenges to both ordinances; Rockwool intervened and moved for judgment on the pleadings.
- The circuit court granted judgment for respondents as to the Stack Ordinance but found the Industrial District Ordinance likely enacted without statutorily required notice; Ranson re-enacted that ordinance on June 30, 2020 with the court-recommended notice.
- Petitioners sought leave (July 2020) to file a second amended complaint adding substantive spot‑zoning, contract‑zoning, and comprehensive‑plan claims; the court denied leave (Sept. 11, 2020) citing prejudice, lack of diligence, judicial estoppel, and futility.
- The Supreme Court of Appeals affirmed, holding the circuit court did not abuse its discretion and declining to entertain a ripeness argument raised for the first time on appeal.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the trial court abused its discretion by denying leave to amend to add substantive zoning claims | Amendment timely and necessary to reach the merits; respondents would not be unfairly prejudiced | Delay was unreasonable; respondents prejudiced (duplicative motion practice, discovery burden, Rockwool investment reliance); amendments futile/judicial estoppel | Affirmed denial: court acted within discretion — grounds: prejudice, lack of diligence, futility, judicial estoppel |
| Whether Industrial District Ordinance claims ripened only when the ordinance was re-enacted June 30, 2020 | Re-enactment cured procedural defect and ripened substantive claims (original ordinance void ab initio) | Petitioners did not preserve that contention below; they previously took a contrary position | Court declined to reach the new ripeness theory on appeal as forfeited; circuit court found petitioners knew of claims earlier |
| Whether new legal theories may be raised first on appeal | May raise ripeness/new theory now because of re-enactment | Issues not raised below are forfeited; appellate courts generally will not consider new theories | Court applied preservation rule and refused to consider issues not presented to the circuit court |
Key Cases Cited
- Perdue v. S. J. Groves & Sons Co., 152 W. Va. 222, 161 S.E.2d 250 (1968) (trial court has discretion to grant or deny leave to amend; denial not reversible absent abuse)
- State ex rel. Vedder v. Zakaib, 217 W. Va. 528, 618 S.E.2d 537 (2005) (lack of diligence in asserting claims justifies denial of leave to amend)
- State v. Costello, 245 W. Va. 19, 857 S.E.2d 51 (2021) (issues not raised below generally cannot be raised for first time on appeal)
- State ex rel. Cooper v. Caperton, 196 W. Va. 208, 470 S.E.2d 162 (1996) (to preserve an issue for appeal, a party must articulate it with sufficient particularity below)
- State v. LaRock, 196 W. Va. 294, 470 S.E.2d 613 (1996) (failure to object at trial typically results in forfeiture of appellate review)
