Jeanne Jackson, of the Estate of Anthony J. Esposito, Jr. v. Quincy Mutual Fire Insurance Company
159 A.3d 610
| R.I. | 2017Background
- Decedent was riding his motorcycle when a trash barrel fell into his lane, became lodged in the front tire, and caused him to be ejected; he subsequently was struck and killed by a passing car.
- Decedent's motorcycle policy (Foremost) lacked uninsured motorist (UM) coverage; decedent owned an automobile insured by Quincy Mutual, which provided UM coverage but contained an exclusion for bodily injury sustained by an insured while "occupying" any motor vehicle owned by that insured which is not insured for UM under the policy.
- Quincy Mutual’s policy defined "occupying" as "in, upon, getting in, on, out or off."
- Plaintiff (executrix) sued for a declaratory judgment seeking UM benefits under the Quincy Mutual policy; Quincy Mutual moved for summary judgment asserting the exclusion applied because decedent was "occupying" his own uninsured motorcycle when killed.
- The trial justice granted summary judgment for Quincy Mutual, relying on Olivier; the Supreme Court reviewed de novo and found genuine factual disputes about which impact caused death and the temporal/spatial separation between impacts.
- The Court held that because the exclusion is construed strictly against the insurer, whether decedent was still "occupying" the motorcycle when fatally injured (simultaneous/near-simultaneous impact vs. a distinct second collision after being on the roadway) is a jury question; summary judgment was vacated and the case remanded.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether decedent was "occupying" his uninsured motorcycle when fatally injured, precluding UM recovery under Quincy Mutual's exclusion | Esposito was ejected and lying in the roadway when struck by the car, so he was no longer "in, upon, getting in, on, out or off" the motorcycle and UM exclusion does not apply | The injuries were effectively simultaneous/causally connected to use of the motorcycle; under Olivier factors decedent remained an occupant and is excluded | Genuine issues of material fact exist about which impact caused death and timing/proximity; exclusion construed strictly against insurer; remand for factfinder |
| Proper interpretation of "occupying" in an exclusionary clause | "Occupying" should be read to exclude only active or proximate presence on vehicle at time of injury; post-ejection injuries not covered | Olivier and some out-of-state cases support a broad interpretation covering near-immediate post-ejection impacts | Because this clause is exclusionary, apply strict construction; whether occupation existed depends on facts (time/distance/causal link) |
| Applicability of Olivier four-factor test (Utica factors) here | Olivier factors do not resolve two-impact scenarios where second impact occurs after ejection | Olivier supports treating the sequence as part of a single injury if causally and temporally contiguous | Olivier guidance is narrower here; when exclusionary language applies, courts may require stricter analysis and factual inquiry |
| Appropriateness of summary judgment | Plaintiff: key factual disputes (which impact caused death; timing/distance) preclude summary judgment | Quincy: sequence essentially instantaneous; no material factual dispute | Summary judgment improper because material factual disputes exist; case remanded |
Key Cases Cited
- General Accident Ins. Co. of Am. v. Olivier, 574 A.2d 1240 (R.I. 1990) (adopted four-factor Utica test for "occupying")
- Peerless Ins. Co. v. Luppe, 118 A.3d 500 (R.I. 2015) (distinguishes inclusory vs. exclusionary policy language; exclusionary clauses construed strictly)
- Farmers Ins. Co. of Wash. v. Clure, 702 P.2d 1247 (Wash. Ct. App. 1985) (held immediate post-ejection ground impact still within "occupying" under facts)
- Mid-Century Ins. Co. v. Henault, 905 P.2d 379 (Wash. 1995) (where a second collision occurred after an unspecified interval post-ejection, insured was not "occupying")
- Miller v. Amica Mut. Ins. Co., 931 A.2d 1180 (N.H. 2007) (post-ejection strike while lying in roadway was not "occupying"; exclusion construed strictly)