73 F.4th 431
6th Cir.2023Background
- In August 2021 Michigan State University adopted a mandatory COVID-19 vaccine policy for all faculty and staff (including remote employees); FDA- or WHO-approved vaccines satisfied the requirement.
- Medical exemptions were limited to CDC-recognized contraindications and ADA disabilities; natural immunity (prior infection/antibodies) was not recognized as a medical exemption.
- Three employees with documented prior COVID-19 infections/antibodies (Norris, Ehm, Rohrer) refused vaccination; Ehm was terminated, Rohrer placed on unpaid leave, Norris obtained a religious exemption and faced no discipline.
- Plaintiffs sued seeking declaratory and injunctive relief on three grounds: substantive due process (bodily autonomy/decline medical treatment), unconstitutional condition on employment, and federal preemption under the EUA statute (21 U.S.C. § 360bbb-3).
- The district court dismissed all counts, applying Jacobson/rational-basis review to the due-process claim, rejecting the unconstitutional-condition and preemption theories; plaintiffs appealed.
- MSU later rescinded the policy, but the appeal remained live because plaintiffs sought nominal damages and the challenged employment actions had not been undone.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Substantive due process: Does MSU’s vaccine mandate violate liberty interests in bodily integrity/autonomy? | Forcing vaccination (or termination) overrides fundamental liberty; natural immunity makes vaccination medically unnecessary. | Jacobson governs; the mandate furthers public health and is rationally related to that interest. | Rational basis applies (Jacobson). Policy upheld as rationally related to public-health interest. |
| Unconstitutional condition: Is conditioning employment on vaccination an unconstitutional waiver of rights? | Requiring vaccination as a term of employment coerces waiver of bodily-autonomy rights. | No coercion where government acts as employer enforcing a rational health policy; plaintiffs show no underlying constitutional violation. | Fails: because the policy is constitutional under rational-basis review, the unconstitutional-condition claim cannot succeed. |
| Preemption / Supremacy Clause: Does the EUA statute bar employer vaccine mandates or render them irrational? | EUA requires that individuals be informed of option to accept or refuse; that conflicts with employer mandates and preempts state action. | EUA’s informed-consent language governs provider–patient interactions and does not prohibit employment-based vaccination requirements; no express HHS condition forbids such mandates. | Fails: statute does not preempt or invalidate MSU’s employment vaccination requirement. |
Key Cases Cited
- Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905) (upholding mandatory vaccination; court applies deferential "real or substantial relation" standard)
- New York Rapid Transit Corp. v. City of New York, 303 U.S. 573 (1938) (rational-basis principle: legislation not arbitrary if any conceivable state of facts sustains it)
- Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo, 141 S. Ct. 63 (2020) (recognizing public-health interests but applying constitutional review principles in COVID context)
- S. Bay United Pentecostal Church v. Newsom, 140 S. Ct. 1613 (2020) (per curiam decision addressing public-health restrictions and judicial review)
- Klaassen v. Trustees of Indiana Univ., 7 F.4th 592 (7th Cir. 2021) (upholding university vaccine policies under deferential review in COVID context)
- Planned Parenthood of Greater Ohio v. Hodges, 917 F.3d 908 (6th Cir. 2019) (doctrine on unconstitutional-condition claims)
- Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991) (permitting employment conditions when only rational basis is required)
- Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661 (1994) (government has broader authority when acting as employer)
