Jeanetta Nailon v. Univ. of Cincinnati, 16-4691

Background

Jeanetta Nailon worked as a Resolution Analyst in the University of Cincinnati Bursar’s Office from 2001 until her termination in 2013 for purportedly handling her son’s loan account.
Nailon had previously processed waivers and adjustments on her son’s account when it fell within her assigned alphabetical range; defendants say this violated a longstanding policy later memorialized in 2013.
Nailon’s niece, Ashley Davis, whose short-term loan Nailon approved in 2013, lodged complaints of racial discrimination after the University withdrew Davis from classes over a disputed balance.
Davis’s complaint was shared with Bursar Ken Wolterman; shortly thereafter the Bursar’s Office investigated Nailon and terminated her for misconduct relating to her son’s account.
Nailon sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging First Amendment retaliation based on her niece’s protected speech; the district court denied summary judgment and denied qualified immunity to individual defendants Wolterman, Debra Jones, and Karla Gacasan.
The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of qualified immunity, holding that (viewing disputed facts in Nailon’s favor) Nailon stated a First Amendment retaliation claim and the law was clearly established.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Nailon stated a First Amendment retaliation claim based on her niece’s speech	Nailon argues Davis’s complaints were protected speech and Nailon was fired in retaliation for that speech	Defendants argue the speech was not Nailon’s and any termination was for misconduct, not retaliation	Court: A reasonable juror could find Davis’s speech protected and a causal link (temporal proximity + Wolterman’s “collusion” comment) — constitutional violation pleaded
Whether qualified immunity shields individual defendants	Nailon: officials knew retaliating for a relative’s protected speech was unlawful	Defendants: no clearly established law putting officials on notice that firing someone for a relative’s speech violates the First Amendment	Court: Precedent and facts put reasonable officials on notice; qualified immunity denied
Whether speech by a private citizen relative can support a § 1983 retaliation claim	Nailon: private citizens have First Amendment protection and third‑party reprisals can form a basis for retaliation claims	Defendants: Third‑party/relative speech is not clearly within First Amendment retaliation protections here	Court: Supreme Court and Sixth Circuit precedent allow third‑party reprisal claims; close, known familial relationship here supports claim
Liability of non‑final decisionmakers (Jones, Gacasan)	Nailon: their investigation and recommendations were influential in termination	Defendants: they were not the final decisionmaker and thus not liable	Court: Influential recommenders can be liable; facts could show they played an influential role — not entitled to immunity at summary judgment

Key Cases Cited

Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (government officials entitled to qualified immunity unless they violate clearly established law)
Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (speech‑by‑government‑employees test for First Amendment protection)
Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless, LP, 562 U.S. 170 (third‑party reprisal can ground a retaliation claim)
Anderson v. Creighton, 438 U.S. 635 (clearly established rights standard for qualified immunity)
Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730 (officials can be on notice of constitutional violations even in novel factual settings)
Thaddeus‑X v. Blatter, 175 F.3d 378 (elements and causation standard for First Amendment retaliation claims in the Sixth Circuit)
Holzemer v. City of Memphis, 621 F.3d 512 (private citizens have First Amendment right to criticize public officials)
Wenk v. O’Reilly, 783 F.3d 585 (assessing whether reasonable juror could find retaliation and whether law was clearly established)
Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (qualified immunity two‑prong analysis may be addressed in either order)