Jean Lifter v. Cleveland State Univ.
707 F. App'x 355
| 6th Cir. | 2017Background
- In 2012 Sheldon Gelman (tenured law professor) led a successful faculty union-organizing drive at Cleveland-Marshall College of Law; SERB later certified the bargaining unit.
- Dean Craig Boise criticized Gelman publicly and, in 2013, awarded Gelman (and several others) a $666 merit raise while other faculty received $3,000 or $5,000 raises; Boise says raises were calculated by an objective, tiered formula and later adjusted when the merit pool changed.
- By 2014 enrollment and revenues plunged; Boise assembled a budget task force and, to meet required cuts, eliminated several positions including Assistant Dean Jean Lifter (Gelman’s wife), saving about $132,116 annually.
- Lifter grieved; SERB rejected unfair-labor-practice charges by Gelman and Lifter, finding no nexus between Gelman’s organizing and Lifter’s termination and concluding the layoff was budget-driven.
- Gelman and Lifter sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging First Amendment retaliation (Gelman: low raise and loss of committee appointments; Lifter: termination). The district court granted summary judgment to CSU and Dean Boise; this appeal followed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
Whether Gelman proved his union activity was a substantial or motivating factor for loss of committee appointments | Gelman: temporal proximity and that Boise publicly criticized him supports retaliatory motive for denying appointments | Boise: appointed other pro-union faculty to committees and appointed Gelman to a search committee; no evidence linking appointments to anti-union animus | Held for defendants — no material fact supporting causal link; temporal proximity alone insufficient |
| Whether Gelman proved his $666 raise was retaliatory | Gelman: $666 was chosen intentionally (symbolic punishment) and Boise mis-scored Gelman’s scholarship so he deserved $3,000 | Boise: objective tiered merit system based on recent scholarship/teaching/service; recalculation and equitable adjustments explain $666; pro-union and anti-union faculty received low and high raises alike | Held for defendants — objective explanation supported; no evidence raise was chosen to punish union organizers |
| Whether Lifter can sue on theory that her termination retaliated for Gelman’s protected activity (third-party standing) | Lifter: termination was retaliatory because Boise targeted her to punish Gelman | Boise/CSU: termination was budget-driven reorganization; Lifter lacks standing to assert Gelman’s constitutional rights | Held for defendants — Lifter lacks third-party standing (Gelman could and did litigate his own rights); her claim dismissed for lack of jurisdiction |
| Whether SERB’s prior determinations preclude federal suit | Plaintiffs: SERB ruling adverse but not necessarily preclusive of federal claims | Defendants: SERB decision should have preclusive effect | Held: district court correctly declined to apply preclusion; defendants’ cross-appeal on preclusion is moot given merits disposition |
Key Cases Cited
- Brandenburg v. Housing Authority of Irvine, 253 F.3d 891 (6th Cir. 2001) (elements for First Amendment retaliation claim)
- Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977) (burden-shifting framework for retaliation cases)
- Handy-Clay v. City of Memphis, 695 F.3d 531 (6th Cir. 2012) (protected conduct need only be a motivating factor)
- Benison v. Ross, 765 F.3d 649 (6th Cir. 2014) (plaintiff establishes prima facie case; employer must show same decision would have occurred absent protected conduct)
- Dye v. Office of the Racing Comm’n, 702 F.3d 286 (6th Cir. 2012) (summary-judgment standard after prima facie retaliation showing)
- Scott v. Eastman Chemical Co., [citation="275 F. App'x 466"] (6th Cir. 2008) (objective rating system can be legitimate nondiscriminatory reason)
- Moody v. Michigan Gaming Control Bd., 847 F.3d 399 (6th Cir. 2017) (third-party standing requires hindrance to third party’s ability to sue)
- Sowards v. Loudon County, 203 F.3d 426 (6th Cir. 2000) (spouse may assert her own First Amendment right to association when fired for spouse’s speech)