JAYVON R. WHITE v. UNITED STATES., 146 A.3d 101

Background

In 2001 White pleaded guilty to second-degree murder while armed and to possession of a firearm during a crime of violence as part of a plea agreement that dismissed other counts and withdrew life-without-parole papers. Judge Retchin conducted the plea colloquy and White acknowledged understanding the court's explanation but did not know his exact sentence.
At the plea colloquy Judge Retchin told White the murder charge carried "20 years to life with a mandatory sentence of at least five to fifteen years," the PFCV charge carried five to fifteen years, and that consecutive sentences could result in "as much as 25 years to life;" she said parole eligibility would not be affected by Truth in Sentencing but stated a consecutive sentence would mean "a minimum of 10 years before [he would] even [be] eligible for parole."
White later sought to withdraw his plea (denied in 2002 and affirmed on appeal in White I), and was sentenced in 2002 to 20-to-life and 5-to-15 years consecutively; the commitment order referenced a "mandatory minimum term of 10 years."
From 2006–2010 White, acting pro se, repeatedly sought clarification about parole eligibility; Bureau of Prisons records he submitted showed conflicting dates (including a parole-eligibility date of March 8, 2025 and earlier parole hearing dates), and the BOP later acknowledged an error in its records.
In 2012 White filed a pro se D.C. Code § 23-110 motion claiming (1) he was misinformed at plea about parole eligibility (that he would be eligible after 10 years when in fact parole eligibility was 25 years), (2) he was entitled to an evidentiary hearing, and (3) the government breached the plea agreement. Judge Anderson denied the § 23-110 motion as procedurally barred and unnecessary to hear; the D.C. Court of Appeals vacated and remanded for an evidentiary hearing and findings.

Issues

Issue	White's Argument	Government's Argument	Held
Whether White's § 23-110 claims are procedurally barred	White says he did not know the true parole consequences during his direct appeal and that subsequent conflicting communications (court/BOP) prevented raising the issue earlier	Gov't says White knew or should have known the claim before appeal and appellate counsel's advice doesn't excuse failure to raise it	Court: Not procedurally barred — exceptional factual context and confusing, inconsistent statements meant claims were not "available" during direct appeal
Whether trial court's alleged misinformation about parole made plea involuntary	White asserts Judge Retchin's statements that parole eligibility would be after 10 years (if consecutive) were misleading and prejudicial to his plea choice	Gov't contends parole is a collateral consequence and court had no obligation; any confusion was known to White earlier	Court: Parole misinformation can be prejudicial; record shows ambiguous/misleading statements so claim may warrant relief — merits an evidentiary hearing
Whether Judge Anderson properly denied an evidentiary hearing on § 23-110	White argues strong presumption in favor of a hearing and factual disputes (credibility, BOP records) require one	Gov't supports summary denial but concedes remand might be appropriate if misinformation could be shown	Court: Denial was erroneous — remand for an evidentiary hearing required because claims are not palpably incredible and credibility questions exist
Whether the government breached the plea agreement by failing to deliver parole benefits	White says he was denied the "fruits" of the plea because parole eligibility turned out to be much later	Gov't argues there was no misinformation from government to object to and no breach shown	Court: Did not resolve merits on breach; remand for hearing to allow factual development (including BOP documents)

Key Cases Cited

Strader v. Garrison, 611 F.2d 61 (4th Cir. 1979) (parole eligibility is ordinarily a collateral consequence not requiring plea advisement)
Spradley v. United States, 421 F.2d 1043 (5th Cir. 1970) (trial court misinformation about parole eligibility can be prejudicial enough to require reversal)
Gates v. United States, 515 F.2d 73 (7th Cir. 1975) (compound misinformation by court about parole presents exceptional circumstances requiring relief)
Washington v. United States, 834 A.2d 899 (D.C. 2003) (procedural default principles for failing to raise claims on direct appeal)
Shepard v. United States, 533 A.2d 1278 (D.C. 1987) (ineffective-assistance claims must be raised when grounds are known during direct appeal)
Head v. United States, 489 A.2d 450 (D.C. 1985) (relief under § 23-110 appropriate only for serious defects not correctible on direct appeal)
Bellinger v. United States, 127 A.3d 505 (D.C. 2015) (strong presumption in favor of an evidentiary hearing on § 23-110 collateral challenges)
Hilliard v. United States, 879 A.2d 669 (D.C. 2005) (denial without hearing upheld only if movant could not under any circumstances establish facts warranting relief)
Hardy v. United States, 988 A.2d 950 (D.C. 2010) (claims are summary-denial proper only if palpably incredible, vague/conclusory, or cannot entitle movant to relief)
Newman v. United States, 705 A.2d 246 (D.C. 1997) (credibility disputes require full evidentiary hearing)