Jay W. Hand v. Harris Hughey, 02-15-00239-CV

Background

Plaintiff Harris Hughey sued Jay W. Hand (and others) for libel and slander arising from a campaign flyer and related oral statements during a 2014 Republican primary runoff for Denton County Justice of the Peace, Precinct 4.
The contested flyer stated Hughey had never voted in a Republican primary prior to his recent run and suggested he only voted in the 2008 general election when Barack Obama won.
Hand moved to dismiss under the Texas Citizens’ Participation Act (TCPA / anti‑SLAPP). The trial court initially granted dismissal, then granted Hughey’s motion for reconsideration and denied Hand’s motion to dismiss. Hand appeals the denial interlocutorily.
Key undisputed evidence: certified voting records showing Hughey voted in the 2008 general election and that he had not voted in Republican primaries from 1990–2013; Hughey’s affidavit admits he voted in some other elections but does not state he voted for Obama or that he voted in earlier Republican primaries.
Central legal question: whether the TCPA applies and, if so, whether Hughey produced clear and specific evidence establishing a prima facie case of defamation (per se) against Hand.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Does the TCPA apply to the alleged campaign statements?	Hughey conceded the Act applies but maintains his claim survives.	Hand contends the flyer and campaign speech are communications on a matter of public concern and fall squarely under the TCPA.	Court found TCPA applicable (basis of motion to dismiss).
Did Hughey present clear and specific evidence establishing a prima facie defamation per se claim?	Hughey argues the flyer and oral statements falsely portrayed him as an Obama voter and as not a Republican, harming his reputation and election.	Hand argues the statements are non‑actionable opinions or substantially true (gist correct per certified records), and Hughey failed to show falsity, malice, causation, or damages.	Trial court ultimately denied dismissal on reconsideration; appellant argues this was error. Under TCPA standards plaintiff must show prima facie evidence; defendant maintains Hughey failed that burden.
Are the statements defamatory per se or only actionable per quod?	Hughey pleaded defamation per se.	Hand argues the statements do not fall into traditional per se categories (crime, dishonesty, loathsome disease, sexual misconduct, or injury to business/profession) and are political opinion/innuendo.	Defendant asserts statements are non‑defamatory political opinion/innuendo; plaintiff failed to meet per se standard.
Were the statements substantially true and lacking proof of damages/causation?	Hughey contends the statements were false and caused his narrow election loss.	Hand points to certified records showing the flyer’s gist was substantially correct and that Hughey offered no testimony proving falsity (e.g., who he voted for in 2008) or damages causally linked to the flyer.	Defendant argues substantial truth defeats falsity element and plaintiff failed to show proximate causation or damages; trial court’s denial of dismissal is contested on this basis.

Key Cases Cited

In re Lipsky, 460 S.W.3d 579 (Tex. 2015) (explains TCPA burden‑shifting and prima facie standard)
Bentley v. Bunton, 94 S.W.3d 561 (Tex. 2002) (elements of defamation and malice requirement for public figures)
Turner v. KTRK TV, Inc., 38 S.W.3d 103 (Tex. 2000) (court decides whether language is defamatory as a matter of law and requires reading statements in context)
Neely v. Wilson, 418 S.W.3d 52 (Tex. 2013) (substantial truth test for falsity in defamation cases)
Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265 (U.S. 1971) (public official/figure precedent on defamation and First Amendment concerns)