Jay Stone v. Board of Election Commissione, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 7825

Illinois requires Chicago mayoral candidates to submit 12,500 nominating signatures from registered city voters to appear on the general-election ballot; signatures must be gathered within 90 days and a voter may sign only one candidate’s petition.
The plaintiffs included four unsuccessful mayoral hopefuls (three failed to meet the threshold) and a voter; they sued claiming the scheme violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments.
The district court denied preliminary injunctive relief before the 2011 election; after the election the suit was amended to challenge the signature number, the 90-day period, and the one-signature-per-voter rule.
The district court granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim; plaintiffs appealed.
The Seventh Circuit reviewed de novo and held that the requirements impose only reasonable, nondiscriminatory burdens and advance important state interests (preventing ballot overcrowding, voter confusion, and frivolous candidacies).
The court affirmed dismissal, finding precedent and the practical record (multiple candidates met the threshold, including a plaintiff) showed the burden was not severe and did not require strict scrutiny.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Constitutionality of 12,500-signature threshold	Threshold severely burdens outsider "Average Joe/Jane" candidates who lack infrastructure or funds	Threshold is reasonable given history, practical availability, and precedent allowing similar or higher percentages	Requirement is constitutional; burden is reasonable and nondiscriminatory
90-day collection window	Ninety days amplifies burden, making meeting threshold impracticable for outsiders	Ninety days is sufficient and comparable to other upheld regimes; not unduly short	Ninety-day window is reasonable and constitutional
One-voter/one-signature rule	Prohibits supporters from signing multiple petitions, amplifying burden	Rule is a neutral restriction equivalent to limiting each voter to one nominating vote; applies equally to all candidates	One-signature rule is nondiscriminatory and constitutional
Whether dismissal at motion-to-dismiss was premature	Plaintiffs asked for a fuller record to prove severity of burden	Court may dismiss if complaint fails to state a plausible constitutional claim based on precedent and pleaded facts	Dismissal proper; no need to remand for further fact development

Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780 (1983) (balancing test for election-related restrictions on candidates and voters)
Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428 (1992) (severity-of-burden framework and standard for reasonable, nondiscriminatory regulations)
Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431 (1971) (upholding signature requirements up to 5% of electorate)
Norman v. Reed, 502 U.S. 279 (1992) (upholding substantial petitioning requirements for minor-party access)
Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724 (1974) (no litmus-paper test; practical inquiry into burdens and state interests)
Munro v. Socialist Workers Party, 479 U.S. 189 (1986) (upholding primary-vote threshold for minor-party access)
American Party of Texas v. White, 415 U.S. 767 (1974) (skepticism of claims of excessive burden when plaintiffs have satisfied the requirements)
Lee v. Keith, 463 F.3d 763 (7th Cir. 2006) (struck down ballot rule where no independent candidate ever satisfied the requirement)
Libertarian Party of Illinois v. Rednour, 108 F.3d 768 (7th Cir. 1997) (requirements not insurmountable where multiple candidates gained access)
Navarro v. Neal, 716 F.3d 425 (7th Cir. 2013) (applying Anderson balancing and recognizing state's interests in preventing frivolous candidacies)
Nader v. Keith, 385 F.3d 729 (7th Cir. 2004) (upholding a 90-day window to collect signatures)
Protect Marriage Illinois v. Orr, 463 F.3d 604 (7th Cir. 2006) (states may impose reasonable petition requirements to prevent ballot overcrowding)