Jay Hymas v. Usdoi
73 F.4th 763
| 9th Cir. | 2023Background
- Jay Hymas, a pro se, unemployed non-prisoner with about $1,033 in cash and modest assets, sued the U.S. Department of the Interior alleging federal contracting/financial-assistance violations.
- Hymas applied to proceed in forma pauperis under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1).
- A magistrate judge granted the IFP application in part and ordered a $100 partial filing fee (out of a $402 total filing + admin fee).
- Hymas moved for reconsideration; the magistrate issued an R&R recommending denial, the district court adopted it, and ordered payment within 14 days.
- Hymas appealed contending that courts may either require full fees or waive fees entirely but may not impose partial fees; the court considered whether it had jurisdiction to hear the appeal because the IFP was granted in part.
Issues
| Issue | Hymas's Argument | DOI's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Jurisdiction to hear appeal of an order granting IFP in part | Order imposing a partial fee is not an appealable final order | Order is effectively final because case cannot proceed without payment | Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291; appealable like a denial of IFP because non-payment would halt the case |
| Whether district courts may impose partial filing fees on non-prisoners | Courts can only require full fee or waive it entirely; partial fees are unauthorized | Courts retain discretion under § 1915(a)(1) to set partial fees for non-prisoners | Olivares controls: courts may impose partial filing fees under § 1915(a)(1) for non-prisoners |
| Whether the PLRA eliminated district-court authority to set partial fees for non-prisoners | PLRA’s rules for prisoner fees show Congress did not authorize partial fees for non-prisoners | PLRA carved out prisoners but left § 1915(a)(1) largely intact for non-prisoners; statutory structure implies no change to non-prisoner discretion | PLRA did not abrogate the court’s power to set partial fees for non-prisoners |
| Whether $100 partial fee was an abuse of discretion | Any fee is improper because Hymas has no income and would be forced to spend his last dollar | District court may consider available cash, assets, and reliance on in-kind stores; fee here was modest (≈10% of cash) | No abuse of discretion: $100 was reasonable given Hymas’s statements about cash, assets, and living on stored supplies |
Key Cases Cited
- Olivares v. Marshall, 59 F.3d 109 (9th Cir. 1995) (courts may impose partial filing fees under § 1915)
- Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552 (U.S. 1988) (standard for de novo review of legal questions)
- Roberts v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for N. Dist. of Cal., 339 U.S. 844 (U.S. 1950) (appealability of orders denying IFP)
- Tripati v. Rison, 847 F.2d 548 (9th Cir. 1988) (IFP denial appealability principles)
- Alexander v. Carson Adult High Sch., 9 F.3d 1448 (9th Cir. 1993) (limits on requiring litigants to pay to proceed; abuse of discretion standard)
- In re Epps, 888 F.2d 964 (2d Cir. 1989) (courts may not deprive litigants of their last dollar)
- United States v. Hinkson, 585 F.3d 1247 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc) (standard for when a district court abuses its discretion)
- Samarripa v. Ormond, 917 F.3d 515 (6th Cir. 2019) (statutory-structure argument supporting courts’ continued discretion over partial fees)