Javonda Scruggs v. Pulaski County, Arkansas
817 F.3d 1087
| 8th Cir. | 2016Background
- Scruggs worked as a Pulaski County juvenile detention officer from 2001 until her termination in May 2013; she suffers from fibromyalgia and degenerative spinal disease.
- From 2008 she used intermittent FMLA leave; by Feb 2013 her physician (Dr. Mocek) restricted her from prolonged sitting/standing/bending and limited lifting to 25 pounds.
- Job description required ability to lift and carry up to 40 pounds; county converted her to continuous FMLA leave because of the lifting restriction.
- Scruggs sought an extra week after her 12-week FMLA expired to obtain a new certification from a rheumatologist (Dr. Chi) allegedly removing restrictions; she never produced such a certification.
- The county terminated her on May 21, 2013, because she could not meet the 40-pound lifting requirement but encouraged reapplication if circumstances changed.
- District court granted summary judgment for the county, finding Scruggs not a "qualified individual" under the ADA/Section 504 and failing to show causation for retaliation/FMLA claims; Scruggs appealed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Scruggs was a "qualified individual" under the ADA/Section 504 (could perform essential functions with or without accommodation) | Scruggs argued lifting 40 lbs was not an essential function because it occurred infrequently and she could be accommodated | County argued 40-lb lifting is essential to protect detainees/staff; job description and staff capability support essentiality | Court: 40-lb lifting is an essential function; Scruggs not qualified |
| Whether county failed to provide a reasonable accommodation (extra week for new FMLA cert or shift reassignment) | Extra week or night-shift reassignment would allow her to meet job requirements | County: extending FMLA beyond 12 weeks is not required; no proof Dr. Chi would remove restrictions; shift change wouldn’t obviate lifting need | Court: requested extra week was not a reasonable accommodation; no evidence a workable accommodation existed |
| Whether county failed to engage in interactive process under ADA | Scruggs claimed county didn’t meaningfully discuss accommodations | County: no reasonable accommodation available so interactive process not required | Court: no liability because no reasonable accommodation was shown |
| Whether termination constituted unlawful retaliation (ADA, Section 504, ACRA, FMLA) | Scruggs argued her request for extra time was protected activity and temporal proximity shows causation | County: the request was not a protected reasonable-accommodation request; termination based on inability to perform essential function | Court: request was not protected (not a reasonable accommodation); no prima facie retaliation/causal link; FMLA claims fail because employee must be able to perform essential functions to take intermittent leave and is not entitled to restoration if still unable at FMLA end |
Key Cases Cited
- Bahl v. Cty. of Ramsey, 695 F.3d 778 (8th Cir. 2012) (summary judgment standard and ADA/Section 504 framework)
- Walz v. Ameriprise Fin., Inc., 779 F.3d 842 (8th Cir. 2015) (elements of ADA discrimination claim)
- Hill v. Walker, 737 F.3d 1209 (8th Cir. 2013) (definition of qualified individual and analysis of essential functions)
- Dropinski v. Douglas Cty., Neb., 298 F.3d 704 (8th Cir. 2002) (lifting as essential function and accommodation burden)
- Alexander v. Northland Inn, 321 F.3d 723 (8th Cir. 2003) (plaintiff’s burden to show accommodation would enable performance)
- Slentz v. City of Republic, Mo., 448 F.3d 1008 (8th Cir. 2006) (FMLA leave limits; employer need not extend beyond 12 weeks)
- Kirkeberg v. Can. Pac. Ry., 619 F.3d 898 (8th Cir. 2010) (request for reasonable accommodation is protected activity)
- Hatchett v. Philander Smith Coll., 251 F.3d 670 (8th Cir. 2001) (employee must be able to perform essential functions to take intermittent leave)