Javier Morales, Jr. v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.), 48A02-1506-PC-596

In 2009 Morales was charged with Class A child molesting and Class B rape; he pled guilty to child molesting in exchange for the rape charge being dropped and a 30-year sentence with 10 years suspended.
About five years later Morales filed a post-conviction petition claiming his trial counsel misadvised him about sentencing exposure (told him he faced a 70-year maximum) and that counsel predicted a biased, largely non-Hispanic jury and a harsh sentencing judge, which induced the plea.
Trial counsel testified he routinely described the most extreme possible exposure to clients, denied telling Morales he faced 70 years, and explained the handwritten note “seventy over thirty-five” meant potential exposure articulated in extremes.
The post-conviction court found counsel credible and concluded Morales failed to prove ineffective assistance or that his plea was involuntary; the Court of Appeals affirmed.
The court applied the Strickland-style standard for ineffective assistance in the guilty-plea context (deficient performance + prejudice) and Segura’s materiality standard for plea withdrawal claims.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether counsel was ineffective by telling Morales he faced a 70-year maximum	Morales: counsel told him he faced 70 years, so plea not knowing/voluntary	State: counsel denied giving that specific advice; note reflected extreme hypothetical exposure	Held: No ineffective assistance; court credited counsel and Morales failed to meet burden
Whether counsel’s statements about judge bias and likely non-Hispanic jury rendered plea involuntary	Morales: counsel’s forecast of biased judge/jury coerced the plea	State: reasonable counsel forecasts do not make a plea involuntary; counsel based comments on experience	Held: Forecasts of trial risk/jury composition did not render plea involuntary
Whether handwritten “seventy over thirty-five” establishes objective basis for relief	Morales: notation supports claim he believed he faced 70 years	State: notation alone is insufficient; counsel’s testimony explained context	Held: Notation without more does not meet Segura materiality standard
Whether plea was knowing and voluntary under statutory/constitutional requirements	Morales: plea influenced by alleged bad advice so not knowing/voluntary	State: plea colloquy and record showed understanding of charges, rights, and sentencing exposure; no coercion shown	Held: Plea was knowing and voluntary; post-conviction relief denied

Carrillo v. State, 982 N.E.2d 468 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (standard of review for post-conviction judgments)
Springer v. State, 952 N.E.2d 799 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (presumption of effective assistance and burden standards)
Segura v. State, 749 N.E.2d 496 (Ind. 2001) (materiality and standard for withdrawing a guilty plea based on counsel error)
State v. Moore, 678 N.E.2d 1258 (Ind. 1997) (requirements for a knowing and voluntary guilty plea)
Edmonds v. Commonwealth, 189 S.W.3d 558 (Ky. 2006) (attorney forecasts about jury composition and trial prospects do not necessarily render a plea involuntary)
Scott v. State, 986 N.E.2d 292 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (distinguishing a case where counsel misadvised about the correct maximum sentence)
Everling v. State, 929 N.E.2d 1281 (Ind. 2010) (example of reversal where judge’s impartiality was questioned)
Abernathy v. State, 524 N.E.2d 12 (Ind. 1988) (judge’s comments indicating bias can be detrimental to defense)