Javier Cabral v. Megan Brennan
853 F.3d 763
| 5th Cir. | 2017Background
- Javier Cabral, a USPS letter carrier, filed multiple EEO complaints and union grievances alleging discrimination, harassment, and retaliation; employer characterized him as insubordinate and accused him of striking a supervisor with a postal vehicle.
- On September 9, 2013, Cabral was placed on unpaid leave for two days after failing to produce a valid driver’s license when asked; he later returned to work and was reimbursed for lost pay.
- Cabral admitted his license had been suspended for a DWI and that he failed to notify supervisors as required; he had an occupational license that may have been invalid for nonpayment of a fee.
- He sued under Title VII and the ADEA; district court granted summary judgment to USPS on most claims but initially denied summary judgment on the September 9, 2013 retaliation claim (unpaid two-day suspension).
- USPS moved for reconsideration arguing the two-day suspension was not a "materially adverse action" under Title VII; the district court granted reconsideration, concluded the suspension was not materially adverse, and dismissed the retaliation claim.
- Cabral appealed, raising (1) a procedural challenge to the standard the district court used to reconsider its interlocutory order and (2) that the two-day suspension could be a materially adverse action.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether district court used correct procedural standard in reconsidering interlocutory order | Cabral: court erred by applying Rule 59(e) (final-judgment standard) instead of Rule 54(b) for interlocutory reconsideration | USPS: court used wrong rule but had the authority to revise an interlocutory order; error was harmless | Court agreed error occurred but was harmless because Rule 59(e) applies a stricter standard than Rule 54(b); no prejudice shown to Cabral |
| Whether a two-day unpaid suspension is a "materially adverse action" under Title VII retaliation standard | Cabral: two-day unpaid suspension was retaliatory and materially adverse (dissuasive to a reasonable worker) | USPS: two-day suspension produced no documented physical, emotional, or economic harm and thus was not materially adverse under Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White | Court held Cabral failed to show materially adverse action—two-day suspension lacked contextual evidence of significant harm and thus did not state a Title VII retaliation claim |
Key Cases Cited
- Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (2006) (defines "materially adverse" as actions that could dissuade a reasonable worker; context-specific inquiry)
- Templet v. HydroChem Inc., 367 F.3d 473 (5th Cir. 2004) (Rule 59(e) is a narrow, extraordinary remedy for manifest errors or newly discovered evidence)
- Lavespere v. Niagara Mach. & Tool Works, Inc., 910 F.2d 167 (5th Cir. 1990) (under Rule 54(b) district courts may reconsider interlocutory orders for any reason deemed sufficient)
- Jenkins v. City of San Antonio Fire Dep’t, 784 F.3d 263 (5th Cir. 2015) (elements of a Title VII retaliation claim)
- Wheat v. Fla. Par. Juvenile Justice Comm’n, 811 F.3d 702 (5th Cir. 2016) (unsupported conclusory allegations of adverse action are insufficient at summary judgment)