2 N.E.3d 724
Ind. Ct. App.2013Background
- Hood's Gardens contracted with Craig Mead to remove an oak tree for $600; Mead was allowed to keep the wood for resale. Mead subcontracted stump removal to Jason Young, who was injured and rendered paraplegic while performing that work.
- Young sought workers' compensation benefits; Mead lacked workers' compensation coverage and produced no certificate to Hood's.
- Hood's filed for declaratory judgment arguing it was not secondarily liable under Indiana Code § 22-3-2-14(b) because the contract value did not exceed $1,000. Young answered; Mead defaulted.
- The trial court struck part of Young's affidavit (an opinion on the value of the wood) and granted summary judgment for Hood's, concluding the contractor’s performance value did not exceed $1,000.
- The appellate majority affirmed: the affidavit’s valuation was properly struck as inadmissible lay/expert opinion, and the statute’s "value" refers to the contractor’s agreed-upon performance value (here $600), so Hood's owed no secondary liability.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether portions of Young's affidavit should be struck | Young: affidavit showed wood value exceeded $400, creating triable issue | Hood's: valuation was inadmissible opinion lacking personal knowledge or expert foundation | Court: struck valuation as speculative lay opinion; no abuse of discretion |
| Whether Hood's is secondarily liable under I.C. § 22-3-2-14(b) (contract value > $1,000) | Young: include value of wood Mead kept plus $600 cash to determine contract value > $1,000 | Hood's: statute requires the contractor's agreed-upon value up front; here Mead's contracted performance value was $600 so no secondary liability | Court: value means contractor's performance value; because Mead's agreed value was $600, Hood's not secondarily liable; summary judgment affirmed |
Key Cases Cited
- Evereit Cash Mut. Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 926 N.E.2d 1008 (Ind. 2010) (describing scope of secondary liability under Indiana workers’ compensation statute)
- Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (U.S. 1986) (federal standard on summary judgment burden-shifting cited in dissent)
- Madison Cnty. Bd. of Comm'rs v. Town of Ingalls, 905 N.E.2d 1022 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (summary judgment purpose and standards)
- Jarboe v. Landmark Cmty. Newspapers, 644 N.E.2d 118 (Ind. 1994) (party moving for summary judgment bears initial burden)