Jason Wayne Belcher v. State
12-14-00115-CR
Tex. Crim. App.Sep 2, 2015Background
- Appellant Jason Wayne Belcher was convicted of aggravated assault of a child for digitally penetrating H.C.; H.C. testified to two occasions.
- Two months before trial, Belcher’s daughter S. disclosed long‑term sexual abuse by Belcher (anal and vaginal intercourse from ages 4–8) and alleged abuse of a younger, nonverbal sister R.; S. did not testify at trial but her teacher and a Child Advocacy Center interviewer relayed her out‑of‑court disclosures.
- The State also introduced Belcher’s prior conviction for aggravated sexual assault of a child.
- The trial court held a pretrial, out‑of‑jury hearing under Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 38.37 §2‑a and admitted evidence of extraneous sexual offenses against other children under art. 38.37 §2(b).
- Belcher objected on due process, propensity/prejudice (Tex. R. Evid. 403), and notice grounds; he also argued the statute was inapplicable because indictment predated the statutory amendment.
- The Twelfth Court of Appeals affirmed: it held §2(b) constitutional, concluded the trial court did not abuse its Rule 403 discretion, applied the amended statute to the trial, and found Belcher failed to preserve a statutory notice complaint.
Issues
| Issue | Belcher's Argument | State's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Constitutionality of art. 38.37 §2(b) (due process) | §2(b) permits propensity evidence and thus tries him for character rather than the charged offense, denying due process | §2(b) is materially like Fed. R. Evid. 414, subject to Rule 403 limits, and therefore constitutional | §2(b) is constitutional; admission did not deny due process |
| Exclusion under Tex. R. Evid. 403 (prejudicial vs. probative) | Prior acts were unnecessary and so unduly prejudicial that they should have been excluded | Prior‑act evidence was highly probative on credibility/propensity where the complaining child’s credibility was central; court performed proper balancing | No abuse of discretion; probative value not substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice |
| Effective date of amended art. 38.37 §2(b) | Amendment should not apply because indictment was returned before the effective date (criminal proceeding = prosecution) | The statute applies to the trial (a criminal proceeding step) occurring after the statute’s effective date | Amendment applied to the trial; trial court did not err in admitting evidence under amended §2(b) |
| Statutory 30‑day notice under art. 38.37 §3 | State failed to give required 30‑day notice of intent to use extraneous conduct evidence | Belcher did not timely object on notice grounds at trial; trial court conducted pretrial hearing and Belcher received a running objection | Error not preserved—Belcher failed to raise notice objection at trial; issue overruled |
Key Cases Cited
- Ex parte Granviel, 561 S.W.2d 503 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978) (burden to show statute unconstitutional)
- In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (U.S. 1970) (due process requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt)
- Fisher v. State, 887 S.W.2d 49 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994) (due process and proof beyond a reasonable doubt)
- Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 342 (U.S. 1990) (due process and fundamental fairness framework)
- United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783 (U.S. 1977) (due process standards)
- United States v. Castillo, 140 F.3d 874 (10th Cir. 1998) (upholding Fed. R. Evid. 414 against due process challenge where Rule 403 protects fairness)
- Jenkins v. State, 993 S.W.2d 133 (Tex. App.—Tyler 1999) (upholding earlier Article 38.37 against due process challenge)
- Howland v. State, 990 S.W.2d 274 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (statute’s applicability measured by "proceeding" steps; trial can be governed by later enactment)
- Gigliobianco v. State, 210 S.W.3d 637 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (defining probative value and Rule 403 balancing)