Jason Vicks v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC
676 F. App'x 167
4th Cir.2017Background
- Jason and Mekeisha Vicks sued Ocwen Loan Servicing in federal court over Ocwen’s role in North Carolina state-court foreclosure proceedings involving the Vicks’ residence.
- The district court dismissed four federal/state-law claims for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under the Rooker–Feldman doctrine.
- The district court separately dismissed the Vicks’ claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED) under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim.
- The Fourth Circuit reviewed jurisdictional dismissal de novo and assessed the scope of Rooker–Feldman after Supreme Court and circuit clarifications narrowing the doctrine.
- The Fourth Circuit concluded the Rooker–Feldman doctrine was misapplied to the Vicks’ first four claims, vacated that part of the dismissal, and remanded those claims to the district court; it affirmed the dismissal of the IIED claim.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Rooker–Feldman bars Vicks’ claims related to Ocwen’s conduct in state foreclosure | Vicks: claims challenge Ocwen’s rights, RESPA violations, and state-law claims independent of state-court judgment | Ocwen: Vicks are state-court losers seeking de facto review of the foreclosure order, so federal court lacks jurisdiction under Rooker–Feldman | Reversed: Rooker–Feldman was improperly applied; claims do not seek appellate review of the state order and may proceed in district court (vacated and remanded) |
| Whether Vicks’ claims are "inextricably intertwined" with the state-court foreclosure order | Vicks: success does not require undoing the state judgment; claims are independent | Ocwen: any ruling for Vicks would call into question and effectively negate the state foreclosure order | Court: clarified that "inextricably intertwined" is not an independent test; mere tension with a state judgment does not deprive federal jurisdiction under Rooker–Feldman |
| Whether district court should dismiss the claims on alternative grounds (e.g., preclusion) | Vicks: urged opportunity to litigate merits in federal court | Ocwen: urged affirmance on jurisdictional or other grounds | Court: declined to resolve alternative defenses or sufficiency; remanded to district court to address those issues first |
| Whether the IIED claim survives Rule 12(b)(6) | Vicks: alleged severe emotional distress caused by Ocwen’s conduct | Ocwen: alleged facts insufficient to meet North Carolina’s high IIED standard | Affirmed: IIED claim fails to plead severe emotional distress under North Carolina law and is dismissed |
Key Cases Cited
- Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280 (2005) (defines narrow scope of Rooker–Feldman and bars federal review of state-court judgments)
- Davani v. Va. Dep’t of Transp., 434 F.3d 712 (4th Cir. 2006) (explains that "inextricably intertwined" language is a conclusion of Rooker–Feldman, not a separate test)
- Thana v. Bd. of License Comm’rs for Charles Cty., Md., 827 F.3d 314 (4th Cir. 2016) (clarifies that tension with a state judgment does not by itself invoke Rooker–Feldman)
- Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (pleading standard: complaints must state a plausible claim for relief under Rule 8)
- Holloway v. Wachovia Bank & Trust Co., N.A., 452 S.E.2d 233 (N.C. 1994) (sets elements for IIED under North Carolina law)