Jason Procknow v. Hugh Curry, 826 F.3d 1009

Procknow was arrested on a parole-warrant at a hotel; police (Curry, Ondrey, Rundquist) tased him three times in ~20 seconds; Procknow suffered facial lacerations and chipped teeth.
Disputed facts: Procknow said he briefly fled, did not resist, and was beaten by officers; officers said he attempted to flee, disobeyed commands, fell into a door/floor after being tased, and might have been reaching for a weapon.
Before trial, district court excluded several misdemeanor convictions but allowed admission of multiple felony convictions (theft of government funds, aggravated identity theft, three for forgery, impersonating a peace officer, and attempted first-degree murder).
Summary judgment had already been granted to defendants as to the first two tasings; the jury considered only whether the third taser application was excessive force.
Jury returned verdict for defendants; district court denied Procknow’s JMOL motion and motion for new trial; Procknow appealed evidentiary rulings and denial of JMOL.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Admissibility of >10-year-old impersonating-a-peace-officer conviction	Admission unfairly prejudicial, minimal probative value	Relevant to credibility given deception; probative value outweighs prejudice	Even if close call, any error was harmless given other admitted convictions; no reversal
Admissibility of attempted first-degree murder conviction	Highly prejudicial for impeachment; little probative value re: taser use	Conviction also admissible as substantive evidence about reasonableness of officers' force	Properly admitted for non‑impeachment purpose; use on cross limited; no reversible error
Whether third taser application was excessive force as a matter of law	Third tasing was 4 seconds after second, after Procknow was incapacitated/injured — unreasonable per se	Given flight, refusal to comply, and officer testimony he saw hands moving (possible weapon), third tasing was objectively reasonable	JMOL denied: viewing evidence favorably to jury, reasonable juror could find the third tasing objectively reasonable
Whether admission of prior convictions required reversal	Convictions so prejudicial they influenced jury	Any prejudicial effect outweighed by probative value and/or was harmless in context	No reversible error; verdict affirmed

Harris v. Chand, 506 F.3d 1135 (8th Cir. 2007) (standard for reviewing Rule 609 evidentiary decisions and prejudice inquiry)
United States v. Brown, 956 F.2d 782 (8th Cir. 1992) (older convictions present close admissibility questions)
United States v. Keene, 915 F.2d 1164 (8th Cir. 1990) (serious convictions often highly prejudicial for impeachment)
Billingsley v. City of Omaha, 277 F.3d 990 (8th Cir. 2002) (standard for JMOL review in excessive-force context)
Peterson v. Kopp, 754 F.3d 594 (8th Cir. 2014) (objective-reasonableness Fourth Amendment framework)
Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989) (use-of-force claims analyzed under objective-reasonableness)
Brown v. City of Golden Valley, 574 F.3d 491 (8th Cir. 2009) (whether officer reasonably perceived a threat is a jury question)
Canny v. Dr. Pepper/Seven-Up Bottling Grp., Inc., 439 F.3d 894 (8th Cir. 2006) (a party who opens subject may waive evidentiary objections)
Ohler v. United States, 529 U.S. 753 (2000) (impeachment evidence introduced by witness may limit appellate review)