Jason Daniel Gustafson, Relator v. Commissioner of Human Services
2016 Minn. App. LEXIS 53
| Minn. Ct. App. | 2016Background
- In 2003 Gustafson pleaded guilty to criminal vehicular operation after a multi-vehicle crash; his sentence included probation.
- In 2015 his wife applied for a home child-care license; Gustafson, living in the home, was subject to a DHS background study.
- DHS disqualified Gustafson under Minn. Stat. § 245C.15 (ten-year disqualification for his offense), determining the ten-year period ran from the discharge of his sentence (commissioner used April 23, 2010).
- Gustafson sought reconsideration, arguing the disqualification should have begun at his 2003 guilty plea (thus expiring in 2013), that the statute’s timing rule is unconstitutional, and asking for set-aside or a variance.
- The commissioner denied set-aside but granted a conditional variance (prohibiting Gustafson from contact with program participants); Gustafson sought certiorari review.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether § 245C.15’s timing rules violate equal protection | Gustafson: statute treats those convicted after a conventional guilty plea worse than those after an Alford plea | Commissioner: statute should be read to apply conviction-based rules to all convictions regardless of plea type; Alford provisions apply to non-conviction dispositions | Court: statute interpreted to separate convictions (subd. 3(a)) from non-conviction Alford-based disqualifications (subd. 3(e)); no equal protection violation |
| Whether § 245C.15 violates substantive due process | Gustafson: timing scheme is arbitrary and capricious and leads to unequal treatment; prosecutorial discretion and possible factual errors render statute irrational | Commissioner: statute rationally relates to protecting vulnerable persons; agency interpretation is reasonable; factual challenges can be raised to agency | Court: no substantive due process violation; statute rationally advances public-safety objective |
| Whether Gustafson was entitled to set-aside on reconsideration | Gustafson: his offense was remote, he completed treatment, won’t care for children, and discharge-date evidence is inaccurate | Commissioner: considered statutory factors (nature/severity, victims’ harm, vulnerability of children, recency, rehabilitation) and found risk of harm; variance appropriate | Court: commissioner’s factual findings supported; denial of set-aside not arbitrary or unsupported |
| Whether the statute is overbroad | Gustafson: statutory sweep is broader than necessary | Commissioner: (implicit) statute targets public-safety risk and fits legislature’s purpose | Court: declined to entertain overbreadth challenge in this context (not a First Amendment facial challenge) |
Key Cases Cited
- American Tower, L.P. v. City of Grant, 636 N.W.2d 309 (2001) (statutory ambiguity analysis)
- Geo. A. Hormel & Co. v. Asper, 428 N.W.2d 47 (1988) (agency statutory interpretation entitled to deference)
- North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970) (Alford plea doctrine)
- State v. Goulette, 258 N.W.2d 758 (Minn. 1977) (Minnesota approval of Alford-type pleas)
- Doe 136 v. Liebsch, 872 N.W.2d 875 (2015) (Alford pleas and collateral consequences)