Jason D. Ray v. State of Alaska, 513 P.3d 1026

Background

Jason D. Ray pleaded guilty under Alaska Crim. R. 11 to second‑degree theft: sentence of 24 months with 20 months suspended and three years probation; he served ~4 months and was released on probation.
The State filed a petition to revoke probation; Ray admitted/found to have violated conditions and asked the sentencing court to reject further probation and impose active time instead.
The superior court sentenced Ray to 16 months (nearly all remaining suspended time) but nonetheless placed him on five years unsupervised probation; Ray appealed.
The court of appeals affirmed the factual findings but produced three separate opinions disagreeing on whether AS 12.55.090(f) abrogated a defendant’s right to reject probation under a Rule 11 plea; the question was certified to the Alaska Supreme Court.
The Alaska Supreme Court held that the 2012–2016 version of AS 12.55.090(f) — by its plain text — prevents a court from reducing or terminating a probation period specified in a Rule 11 plea agreement unless both the prosecutor and the defendant agree, and therefore precludes the previously recognized right to unilaterally reject such probation; the matter was remanded.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Ray)	Defendant's Argument (State)	Held
Does AS 12.55.090(f) permit a defendant to reject probation set in a Rule 11 plea?	The statute does not mention a right to reject; it only limits judges from unilaterally reducing probation.	The statute forbids reducing a specified probation term without both parties’ agreement, eliminating a defendant’s ability to unilaterally reject such probation.	The statute’s plain text bars reduction of a Rule 11–specified probation absent agreement of both parties, so a defendant cannot unilaterally reject that probation.
If a defendant rejects probation, must the court impose the full remaining suspended term or apply Chaney criteria?	Chaney sentencing criteria still govern resentencing; the judge retains discretion to impose less than the remaining suspended time.	The bargain requires enforcement of the suspended term; the court should impose the remaining suspended time.	The court must apply Chaney criteria when sentencing for the probation violation; the judge may impose the balance of suspended time if warranted but is not required automatically to impose the full remaining term.
Does the legislative history contradict the statute’s plain meaning (i.e., was the statute aimed only at judges acting sua sponte)?	The legislative testimony focused on judges and thus shows the statute targeted unilateral judicial reductions, not defendant‑initiated requests.	Legislative materials and testimony reflect an intent to overrule State v. Henry and preserve plea bargains — supporting the statute’s plain effect.	The legislative history is ambiguous but does not overcome the statute’s plain meaning; much history supports overruling Henry and the view that “a deal is a deal.”
Does the rule of lenity apply to construe the statute in favor of defendants?	The statute is ambiguous and should be construed in defendants’ favor.	The statute’s meaning can be discerned by normal construction rules, so lenity does not apply.	Lenity does not apply because the court concluded legislative intent can be ascertained from the statute and its history.

Key Cases Cited

State v. Henry, 240 P.3d 846 (Alaska App. 2010) (court of appeals held defendant may reject plea‑agreed probation and be resentenced to active time under Chaney)
State v. Chaney, 477 P.2d 441 (Alaska 1970) (constitutional sentencing criteria a court must consider when imposing imprisonment)
Brown v. State, 559 P.2d 107 (Alaska 1977) (recognizing a defendant's right to refuse probation if terms are too onerous)
Pete v. State, 379 P.2d 625 (Alaska 1963) (noting court’s power to suspend sentences exists only by legislative grant)
Chinuhuk v. State, 472 P.3d 511 (Alaska 2020) (discussing statutory framework and limits governing probation/parole)