Jason Burrows v. State, 01-15-00302-CR

Appellant Jason Burrows was convicted by a jury of the Class A misdemeanor of official oppression; sentence 365 days jail and $2,000 fine; timely appeal filed.
Allegation: on June 10, 2012, complainant Mariana Martinez says a marked patrol unit stopped her after she swerved; officer allegedly had her lift her shirt and fondled her breasts; she identified Burrows from a photo lineup.
Digital/in‑car recordings, vehicle assignment logs, and related digital evidence were missing/destroyed and not produced to defense.
At punishment hearing the State introduced testimony from an investigator about an unrelated, unadjudicated allegation (a citizen complaint and a subsequent photo‑array identification) over defense objections for hearsay, foundation, and Crawford confrontation‑clause grounds; the alleged complainant did not testify.
Appellant objected to a jury instruction that included the sentence “It is not required that the prosecution prove guilt beyond all possible doubt,” and to admission of the investigator’s out‑of‑court testimonial statements and photo‑array identification at punishment.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (State)	Defendant's Argument (Burrows)	Held
Jury instruction defining "reasonable doubt" by saying “It is not required that the prosecution prove guilt beyond all possible doubt.”	Inclusion is permissible or not reversible; charge as given was proper.	Inclusion of that language over objection violated Paulson/Geesa precedent and harmed defendant—the better practice is to give no definition; jury note requesting a clearer definition shows confusion and harm.	Not resolved in this brief (appellant preserved error and seeks reversal on appeal).
Admission at punishment of investigator’s testimony recounting complainant’s out‑of‑court statements and photo‑array identification (witness unavailable).	Testimony was admissible under Art. 37.07 punishment‑phase rules and was properly admitted.	Testimony was testimonial hearsay under Crawford; admission violated the Confrontation Clause because declarant did not testify and defense had no opportunity to cross‑examine; error requires reversal of punishment unless harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.	Not resolved in this brief (appellant preserved Crawford error and seeks reversal/remand for new punishment hearing).

Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004) (testimonial hearsay from police interrogation triggers Confrontation Clause protections)
Paulson v. State, 28 S.W.3d 570 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) (overruled mandatory Geesa instruction; better practice is to give no definition of reasonable doubt)
Geesa v. State, 820 S.W.2d 154 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (previously required a model reasonable‑doubt definition in charges)
Langham v. State, 305 S.W.3d 568 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (factors for harmlessness analysis of Crawford error)
Reyes v. State, 938 S.W.2d 718 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (treated Geesa as creating systemic requirement later revisited)
Fields v. State, 1 S.W.3d 687 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (use of extraneous‑offense evidence at punishment and threshold requirements)