56 F.4th 88
D.C. Cir.2022Background:
- Three Sikh applicants (Jaskirat Singh, Milaap Chahal, Aekash Singh) are otherwise qualified to enlist in the U.S. Marine Corps but seek religious accommodations to maintain unshorn hair/beards, wear a turban/patka, and wear certain articles of faith.
- Marine Corps policy requires recruits to be clean-shaven and have hair clipped to the scalp during the 13-week boot-camp period; Corps granted accommodations only after basic training, not during it.
- Plaintiffs filed administrative appeals (pending for 10–14 months) and sued under RFRA and the First Amendment; they moved for a preliminary injunction to allow enlistment without shaving and while wearing religious articles during recruit training.
- The district court denied the preliminary injunction based solely on the public-interest (national security) analysis; plaintiffs appealed to the D.C. Circuit.
- The D.C. Circuit found plaintiffs’ RFRA claim highly likely to succeed, faulted the Corps for failing to show narrow tailoring or least-restrictive means given existing exemptions (medical beards, women’s grooming, other services’ policies, tattoos), and ordered injunctions for Jaskirat and Milaap and remanded Aekash for further factfinding on imminence.
Issues:
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Does RFRA apply and does the Corps substantially burden plaintiffs' religious exercise? | RFRA applies; forbidding enlistment unless they shave is a substantial burden on sincere religious practice. | Government accepts substantial burden but contends the denial furthers compelling military interests. | RFRA applies; the burden is substantial and plaintiffs have an overwhelming likelihood of success. |
| Whether the Corps has a compelling interest in denying exemptions during boot camp. | Plaintiffs: Corps’ asserted cohesion/discipline interests are not particularized and are undermined by existing exemptions and other branches’ policies. | Corps: Uniformity in boot camp is necessary to create a team mindset and cannot tolerate departures. | Court: Interest in cohesion is compelling but Corps failed to show why it must deny these specific exemptions given medical, gender, academy, and branch-wide exceptions. |
| Whether denial is the least restrictive means. | Plaintiffs: Corps did not consider or rebut readily available, less-restrictive alternatives used by other services (e.g., tied beards, turbans), nor explain why exceptions already granted wouldn't suffice. | Corps: Granting exemptions would erode discipline and have cumulative detrimental effects across the force. | Court: Corps did not meet RFRA’s least-restrictive-means burden; policy is both underinclusive and overinclusive. |
| Equitable factors and irreparable harm for preliminary injunctions. | Plaintiffs: Denial causes immediate, irreparable RFRA/First Amendment injury and public interest favors religious accommodation; two plaintiffs face imminent enlistment harm. | Corps: Preliminary relief would disturb military training status quo and raise national-security concerns. | Court: Balance/public interest favor injunctions for Jaskirat and Milaap (irreparable harm shown); remand for Aekash to resolve imminence. |
Key Cases Cited
- Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296 (1983) (military discipline limits judicial review but service members retain constitutional protections)
- Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1 (1973) (courts defer to professional military judgments)
- Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 555 U.S. 7 (2008) (preliminary injunction standard and deference in military contexts)
- Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986) (military interests can outweigh individual religious claims absent statutory accommodation)
- Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficiente União do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418 (2006) (RFRA strict-scrutiny framework applies at preliminary-injunction stage)
- Holt v. Hobbs, 574 U.S. 352 (2015) (RFRA requires least-restrictive means; government must justify underinclusive policies)
- Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682 (2014) (RFRA/compelling-interest and narrow-tailoring principles)
- Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, 141 S. Ct. 1868 (2021) (narrowing of compelling-interest analysis to the specific exemption sought)
- Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (government must show that exemption would undermine its interest)
- Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993) (laws underinclusive toward secular analogues violate free exercise)
- United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709 (2012) (requires causal link between restriction and interest served)