Jarvis v. Kansas Dept. of Revenue
473 P.3d 869
| Kan. | 2020Background
- Officer followed Jarvis, initiated a traffic stop, smelled alcohol and observed bloodshot eyes; Jarvis performed field sobriety tests, was arrested for DUI, and refused a breath test at the station.
- Officer completed a DC-27 certifying refusal and the Kansas Department of Revenue (KDR) administratively suspended Jarvis’s license.
- An administrative hearing officer affirmed the suspension; Jarvis sought de novo review in Johnson County District Court.
- The district court found the officer not credible, concluded the traffic stop lacked reasonable suspicion (was unlawful), and set aside the suspension under K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 8-1020.
- The Court of Appeals affirmed; the Kansas Supreme Court granted review and affirmed both lower courts, holding courts may review constitutional issues under K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 8-1020(p) and may set aside suspensions if the unlawful stop is proven.
Issues
| Issue | Jarvis's Argument | KDR's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 8-1020(p) permits courts to consider constitutionality of the stop and set aside suspensions | (Jarvis) The 2016 amendment lets courts consider any constitutional issue, including lawfulness of the encounter, and invalidate suspensions flowing from unconstitutional stops | (KDR) The amendment is procedural/advisory only and cannot be used to reverse suspensions | Courts may consider constitutional issues under § 8-1020(p); when proven, courts may set aside suspension under §§ 8-1020(o)-(q) and the KJRA |
| Whether a statutory remedy exists (making exclusionary rule unnecessary) | (Jarvis) The 2016 amendment created a statutory path to invalidate suspensions based on unlawful encounters, obviating need for the exclusionary rule | (KDR) The statute does not expressly authorize suppression or reversal for constitutional violations; Martin still controls exclusionary-rule analysis | The amendment provides a statutory remedy (setting aside the order) for unlawful encounters during judicial review; exclusionary-rule analysis is not required to obtain that remedy |
| Whether the exclusionary rule applies in administrative suspension proceedings | (Jarvis) Amendment rendered statutory remedy available so exclusionary-rule doctrine need not be invoked | (KDR) Martin held exclusionary rule unavailable; the 2016 amendment did not overrule that holding | Court relies on statutory remedy; it need not decide broad exclusionary-rule application here because statute permits setting aside suspension for unlawful stops |
| Whether district court’s factual finding that the stop lacked reasonable suspicion is supported | (Jarvis) Officer’s account contradicted dashcam and report; no objective basis for stop | (KDR) Officer observed weaving, center-line crossing, near-mailbox miss—sufficient for reasonable suspicion | District court’s credibility and factual findings are supported by substantial competent evidence; stop was unlawful and suspension properly set aside |
Key Cases Cited
- Martin v. Kansas Dept. of Revenue, 285 Kan. 625 (2008) (pre-2016 holding that administrative hearing issues were limited and exclusionary rule did not apply to suspension proceedings)
- Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (establishes that stops are seizures requiring reasonable, articulable suspicion)
- Pennsylvania Bd. of Probation & Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357 (1998) (exclusionary-rule application requires balancing deterrence benefits against social costs)
- Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340 (1987) (discusses nature and purpose of exclusionary rule)
- Ostmeyer v. Kansas Dept. of Revenue, 16 Kan. App. 2d 639 (1992) (statutory violations of implied consent procedures can justify invalidating suspension)
- Meigs v. Kansas Dept. of Revenue, 16 Kan. App. 2d 537 (1992) (same—statutory noncompliance can support setting aside suspension)
- Kingsley v. Kansas Dep’t of Revenue, 288 Kan. 390 (2009) (noting Fourth Amendment claims could be raised but had limited practical effect under prior law)
- City of Wichita v. Molitor, 301 Kan. 251 (2015) (reasonable-suspicion standard requires a particularized, objective basis)
- State v. Pollman, 286 Kan. 881 (2008) (definition and explanation of reasonable suspicion)