727 S.E.2d 786
Va. Ct. App.2012Background
- Spence was convicted in the Court of Appeals of Virginia of two counts of robbery, abduction, multiple firearm offenses, and wearing a mask; the convictions arose from a March 2, 2010 robbery at a Chesapeake SuperMart and related events.
- The robber wore a dark hooded jacket with a tag on the lower left front and distinctive gloves; the store owner identified the robber by height and voice, not facial features.
- Nine days after the robbery, police encountered Spence near the SuperMart; dry gloves and a handgun were found behind trees, with the gloves matching the color/markings of those worn by the robber.
- DNA on the gloves could not be eliminated as including Spence; the gloves and handgun matched the robber’s jacket and weapon in color/appearance.
- Before trial, Spence’s appointed senior assistant public defender sought withdrawal due to a threat by Spence; the court re-appointed the Public Defender’s Office with another attorney.
- At trial, the store owner testified to identifying the robber by height/voice; after a mistrial motion related to a potentially prejudicial statement, the court allowed clarifying questions and did not give a cautionary instruction; the jury ultimately convicted Spence and sentenced him to 76 years with 11 suspended.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Mistrial due to prejudicial witness statement | Spence argues the store owner’s statement implied a second offense. | Spence asserts prejudicial error requiring mistrial or cautionary instruction. | No error; clarification cured ambiguity and no abuse of discretion in denying mistrial. |
| Sufficiency of the evidence to prove guilt | Commonwealth contends evidence linked Spence to robbery, abduction, firearms, and mask. | Spence contends witnesses could not identify him and DNA evidence was inconclusive. | Sufficient evidence supported all convictions; reasonable juror could find all elements beyond a reasonable doubt. |
| Public defender withdrawal and Sixth Amendment conflict | Spence claims actual conflict of interest necessitating withdrawal of the Public Defender’s Office. | Conflict adversely affected representation; office should be relieved. | Court did not abuse discretion; no showing of actual conflict affecting performance; Sixth Amendment not violated. |
Key Cases Cited
- Blanton v. Commonwealth, 280 Va. 447 (2010) (standard for mistrial ruling; prejudice must be indelible)
- Goins v. Commonwealth, 251 Va. 442 (1996) (discretion in denying cautionary instruction)
- Smith v. Commonwealth, 239 Va. 243 (1990) (denial of mistrial or failure to instruct not per se reversible)
- Williams v. Commonwealth, 278 Va. 190 (2009) (Jackson v. Virginia standard for sufficiency of evidence)
- Brown v. Commonwealth, 56 Va. App. 178 (2010) (circumstantial evidence given full weight as direct testimony)
- Jackson v. United States, 443 U.S. 307 (1981) (standard for reviewing sufficiency of evidence (reasonable doubt))
- Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162 (2002) (actual conflict of interest must affect counsel's performance)
