Janya Sawyer v. Foster Wheeler LLC
2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 11081
| 4th Cir. | 2017Background
- Joseph Morris worked in the Bethlehem Steel Sparrows Point Shipyard (1948–1970s) and died of mesothelioma in 2015; his estate sued Foster Wheeler and others in Maryland state court alleging failure to warn about asbestos exposure from boilers Foster Wheeler manufactured.
- Foster Wheeler manufactured boilers under U.S. Navy contracts; boilers were shipped in pieces to the Shipyard for assembly by shipyard employees.
- Foster Wheeler removed the action to federal court under 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1) (federal officer removal), asserting it acted under the Navy and possessed a colorable government-contractor immunity defense (Boyle defense) to failure-to-warn claims.
- Foster Wheeler submitted affidavits describing Navy specifications, Navy control over documentation/warnings, and a former Navy officer’s affidavit asserting the Navy’s superior knowledge of asbestos hazards.
- The district court remanded, finding Foster Wheeler failed to show a colorable federal defense and lacked a causal connection between the alleged conduct and official authority; it assumed removal timeliness was a close question but did not decide it.
- The Fourth Circuit reversed as to the substantive § 1442(a)(1) requirements, concluding Foster Wheeler met the "acting under," colorable defense, and relatedness elements, and remanded for the district court to decide timeliness.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Foster Wheeler was "acting under" a federal officer for § 1442(a)(1) removal | Foster Wheeler was not sufficiently controlled by the Navy to be acting under a federal officer for the conduct giving rise to plaintiffs’ claims | Foster Wheeler contracted with the Navy, followed detailed Navy specs, and assisted the Navy’s duties, satisfying the "acting under" standard | Held: Foster Wheeler was a person "acting under" the Navy; contractor status under Navy contracts satisfies this element |
| Whether Foster Wheeler asserted a colorable federal defense (government-contractor immunity) to plaintiffs’ failure-to-warn/product-warning claims | Plaintiffs: Navy did not prohibit or reject additional warnings to shipyard workers; thus Boyle immunity does not apply to the alleged failure to warn shop workers | Foster Wheeler: Navy dictated/approved warnings for boilers, Foster Wheeler complied, and the Navy had superior knowledge of asbestos hazards — satisfying Boyle criteria | Held: Foster Wheeler made a colorable showing of Boyle-based government-contractor immunity for warnings on the boilers (sufficient for removal) |
| Whether the alleged conduct was sufficiently connected to official authority (causal nexus / "for or relating to") | Plaintiffs: There was no specific Navy direction about warnings to shipyard workers, so no causal nexus to federal authority | Foster Wheeler: The Navy prescribed warnings for the boilers and Foster Wheeler’s compliance connects the claims to government-directed conduct; § 1442(a)(1)’s "or relating to" language requires only a connection/association | Held: The required connection/association was present; the district court applied too strict a causal standard |
| Timeliness of removal notice | Plaintiffs: Removal was untimely (filed >30 days after Foster Wheeler learned of its federal defense) | Foster Wheeler: Removal was proper (court must decide timeliness in first instance) | Held: Fourth Circuit did not decide timeliness; remanded for the district court to determine it initially |
Key Cases Cited
- Watson v. Philip Morris Cos., 551 U.S. 142 (defining "acting under" and construing § 1442 liberally for contractors)
- Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 487 U.S. 500 (establishing government-contractor immunity framework)
- Jefferson County v. Acker, 527 U.S. 423 (addressing causal-connection standard and purpose of § 1442 removal)
- Ripley v. Foster Wheeler LLC, 841 F.3d 207 (4th Cir.) (applying Boyle principles in similar contractor-context)
- Papp v. Fore-Kast Sales Co., 842 F.3d 805 (3d Cir.) (interpreting the statutory "relating to" language and connection standard)
- Oliver v. Oshkosh Truck Corp., 96 F.3d 992 (7th Cir.) (articulating three-part Boyle test for failure-to-warn cases)
- Tate v. Boeing Helicopters, 55 F.3d 1150 (6th Cir.) (explaining government discretion suffices; not necessary to show prohibition of additional warnings)
- Bennett v. MIS Corp., 607 F.3d 1076 (6th Cir.) (noting § 1442 permits removal of entire case when at least one controversy involves a federal officer)