Janvey v. Alguire
846 F. Supp. 2d 662
N.D. Tex.2011Background
- Receiver filed an action to recover approximately $760 million in CD proceeds from Stanford-related entities and investors, alleging the Employee Defendants received compensation through the Stanford scheme.
- Employee Defendants move to dismiss the Receiver’s Employee Complaint under Rules 8, 9, 12(b)(1), 12(b)(2), and 12(b)(6).
- Court addresses subject-matter and personal jurisdiction, finding the Receiver has standing as the receivership court and the court has nationwide jurisdiction over assets traceable to the Receivership Estate.
- Court applies TUFTA (Texas law) to the fraudulent-transfer claim, holding the Receiver pleads a Ponzi-scheme-based actual intent to defraud and that the affirmative defense of good faith is not shown on the face of the pleadings.
- Court also allows an alternative unjust-enrichment claim, noting Texas law may recognize money had and received as the underlying basis, and that Rule 9(b) does not apply to TUFTA claims in this context.
- Overall, court denies the Employee Defendants’ motions to dismiss, finding the Receiver has stated valid claims under Rule 8(a) and Rule 12(b)(6).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Does the court have subject-matter jurisdiction over the Receiver's claims? | Receiver has authority under the Receivership Order and 28 U.S.C. § 754 to pursue asset recovery for creditors. | Crimmins challenges standing and comity due to Antigua liquidation; argues lack of jurisdiction. | Court has subject-matter jurisdiction. |
| Does the court have personal jurisdiction over Crimmins and assets in his custody? | Crimmins resides in Texas and bank activities link to the Receivership Estate; nationwide service supports jurisdiction. | Crimmins contests in rem or in personam jurisdiction and venue. | Court has personal jurisdiction over Crimmins and assets. |
| Does the Receiver state a valid TUFTA fraudulent-transfer claim? | Stanford Defendants operated a Ponzi scheme; transfers to Employee Defendants were made with actual intent to defraud. | Defendants suggest lack of specificity or applicable law; argue good-faith defenses apply. | Receiver states a valid TUFTA claim; Ponzi scheme inference supports actual intent. |
| Can the Receiver plead an unjust-enrichment (money had and received) claim? | Unjust enrichment is a viable equitable remedy to disgorge transfers obtained from the scheme. | Unjust enrichment as an independent claim under Texas law is uncertain; Rule 9(b) may apply variably. | Receiver may pursue an unjust enrichment claim under either applicable law. |
| Do Rule 8 and Rule 9 pleading standards apply to the TUFTA and unjust-enrichment claims? | Receiver's complaint satisfies Rule 8; claims are adequately pleaded for relief and choice-of-law issues are addressed. | Rule 9(b) requirements may apply to fraud-based TUFTA claims or to third-party transfers in some contexts. | Complaint complies with Rule 8; Rule 9(b) not required for TUFTA in this context; sufficient detail provided. |
Key Cases Cited
- Ramming v. United States, 281 F.3d 158 (5th Cir.2001) (jurisdictional questions; limits on dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction)
- Home Builders Ass’n of Miss., Inc. v. City of Madison, 143 F.3d 1006 (5th Cir.1998) (subject-matter jurisdiction standard; burden on plaintiff)
- Nowak v. Ironworkers Local 6 Pension Fund, 81 F.3d 1182 (2d Cir.1996) (jurisdictional analysis; narrow grounds for dismissal for lack of jurisdiction)
- Haile v. Henderson Nat’l Bank, 657 F.2d 816 (6th Cir.1981) (ancillary receivership extends territorial jurisdiction; nationwide service under §1692)
- Alguire v. Alguire, 647 F.3d 585 (5th Cir.2011) (Ponzi scheme evidence supports actual intent; standing for TUFTA claims)
- Warfield v. Byron, 436 F.3d 551 (5th Cir.2006) (Ponzi schemes imply insolvency; supports finding of fraudulent intent)
- Donell v. Kowell, 533 F.3d 762 (9th Cir.2008) (mere existence of Ponzi scheme suffices to infer intent to defraud)
- Vision Communications, Inc. v. Taylor, 74 F.3d 287 (D.C.Cir.1996) (section 754/1692 paradigm for receiverships)