Janos Farkas v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. And Brice Vander Linden & Wernic, P.C. N/K/A Buckley Madole, P.C., 03-14-00716-CV

Background

Farkas challenged Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. and Brice Vander Linden & Wernick, P.C. for alleged failure to comply with the Texas Constitution and deed-of-trust terms in a home equity loan foreclosure.
The case involves Texas Debt Collection Act, Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code §12.002, and Texas Constitutional protections for extension-of-credit under Art. XVI, §50(a)(6).
WellsBank and Brice moved for traditional and no-evidence summary judgments; Farkas cross-moved for partial summary judgment and objected to WellsBank’s evidence.
Key notices and filings include the April 21, 2011 Notice of Default and Intention to Accelerate and a July 23, 2011 Notice of Acceleration, which allegedly referenced the wrong loan and incorrect entities.
The trial court granted Wells_Bank’s and Brice’s traditional and no-evidence motions for summary judgment, and denied Farkas’ partial summary judgment; Farkas appealed with the Third Court of Appeals ultimately affirming the trial court’s disposition.
The appellate record shows the final order and judgment dated October 13, 2014, disposing of all claims and awarding relief to the defendants.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Did the trial court err in overruling Farkas’s objections to Wells_Bank’s summary judgment evidence?	Farkas preserved objections to Exhibit 1, 3, 4; evidence was hearsay, conclusory, or inconsistent, requiring strike.	Exhibits supported MSJ; objections were improper or waived.	Yes; the court’s overruling of objections was an error.
Did Wells_Bank’s traditional and no-evidence MSJs properly support a §50(a)(6) violation?	Wells_Bank failed to prove all elements; notices were defective and misapplied to the HEEC loan.	Defendant complied with DOT and constitutional requirements; notices and acceleration were proper.	No; the MSJs should fail as there were unresolved questions of liability under the constitution.
Did Wells_Bank and Brice properly prevail on the TDCA claim (Tex. Fin. Code §392.001, et seq.)?	Defendants’ conduct (misidentifying the debt, improper threats of foreclosure) violated the TDCA.	No TDCA violation; actions were not wrongful under TDCA.	No; the TDCA claims were not properly defeated by the MSJs.
Did Wells_Bank and Brice properly prevail on the §12.002 fraudulent-document claim?	Defendants filed documents asserting fraudulent liens or claims against property.	Documents were not fraudulent or improperly used.	No; the §12.002 motion should not have been granted.
Was Brice entitled to attorney immunity as a defense to liability?	Brice acted outside litigation; no attorney immunity applies.	Brice, a professional corporation, sought to defend Wells_Bank.	No; Brice is not immune from liability under §392.001 and §12.002.

Key Cases Cited

Ogden v. Gibraltar Sav. Assoc., 640 S.W.2d 232 (Tex. 1982) (notice of acceleration requires proper notice; connection to property foreclosure law)
Casso v. Brand, 776 S.W.2d 551 (Tex. 1989) (summary judgment evidence must be clear, positive, direct and not conclusory)
Brown v. State, 960 S.W.2d 772 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1997) (abuse of discretion standard for evidentiary rulings)
Taylor Elec. Services, Inc. v. Armstrong Elec. Supply Co., 167 S.W.3d 522 (Tex.App.- Ft. Worth 2005) (intent element in fraudulent-document claims; reasonable inference from conduct)
McCamish v. F. E. Appling Interests, 991 S.W.2d 787 (Tex. 1999) (attorney liability limits; no broad immunity for attorneys in all contexts)