42 F.4th 56
2d Cir.2022Background
- Petitioner Jung Hee Jang, a South Korean national, pleaded guilty in 2014 to attempted money laundering in the second degree under N.Y. Penal Law §§ 110 & 470.15(1)(b)(ii)(A); she received a sentence of time served.
- DHS charged Jang with removal for unlawful entry; she conceded removability and sought cancellation of removal under INA § 240A(b).
- An IJ denied cancellation, finding Jang ineligible because her conviction was a "crime involving moral turpitude" (CIMT), relying on the BIA’s earlier In re Tejwani decision.
- The BIA affirmed the IJ, again invoking Tejwani; Jang appealed to the Second Circuit arguing the governing New York statute requires only knowledge, not the specific depraved intent the BIA requires for a CIMT.
- The Second Circuit held § 470.15(1)(b)(ii)(A) requires mere knowledge that a transaction is designed to conceal proceeds and does not require the "evil intent" or intent to impair government function needed to establish a CIMT; it granted the petition and remanded.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether N.Y. Penal Law § 470.15(1)(b)(ii)(A) (2d-degree money laundering) is a CIMT | § 470.15(1)(b)(ii)(A) requires only knowledge that a transaction is designed to conceal proceeds, not a depraved or fraudulent intent; thus not a CIMT | Money laundering is inherently deceptive and impairing to government function (per In re Tejwani) and therefore a CIMT | Not a CIMT: the statute requires mere knowledge that a transaction is designed to conceal, not the specific "evil intent" for CIMT |
| Whether the BIA properly relied on In re Tejwani | Tejwani interpreted a pre-2000 version of the statute that contained an intent element and thus is inapposite to Jang’s post‑2000 conviction | BIA treated Tejwani as controlling precedent | BIA erred to rely on Tejwani because the governing statutory text at the time of Jang’s offense lacks the intent element Tejwani addressed |
| Whether Jang’s conviction renders her categorically ineligible for cancellation of removal | Because the offense is not a CIMT, Jang remains eligible for cancellation under INA § 240A(b) | Conviction is a CIMT and bars cancellation | Petition granted and case remanded: conviction is not a CIMT, so eligibility must be reconsidered by the agency |
Key Cases Cited
- Moncrieffe v. Holder, 569 U.S. 184 (establishes the categorical approach and the "least-acts" rule)
- Mendez v. Barr, 960 F.3d 80 (knowledge alone is insufficient; CIMT requires a specific depraved intent)
- Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243 (governs the modified categorical approach and use of limited documents)
- Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254 (distinguishes divisible statutes from indivisible ones for categorical analysis)
- Pereida v. Wilkinson, 141 S. Ct. 754 (burden is on noncitizen to show which statutory subsection was the conviction)
- Gill v. INS, 420 F.3d 82 (applies categorical approach to determine CIMT)
- Rodriguez v. Gonzales, 451 F.3d 60 (deceit and intent to impair government functioning suffice for CIMT)
- Santana-Felix v. Barr, 924 F.3d 51 (when conviction is for attempt, analyze whether the substantive offense is a CIMT)