Janet Thorpe, as Personal Respresentative of the Estate of Jennifer Palmer v. Memorial Sloan-Kettering Cancer Center, Sam Sunghyun Yoon, M. D., and Sinchun Hwang, M. D.
6D2023-3493
| Fla. Dist. Ct. App. | Apr 17, 2025Background
- Jennifer Palmer, a Florida resident, sought cancer treatment at Memorial Sloan-Kettering (MSK) in New York, where she was evaluated and treated by Dr. Yoon and Dr. Hwang, both New York-based physicians.
- Following surgery in New York and subsequent follow-ups, Palmer returned to Florida, where she continued her treatment until her death.
- Palmer’s estate, represented by Janet Thorpe, sued MSK, Dr. Yoon, and Dr. Hwang in Florida for medical malpractice, alleging negligent acts and omissions during Palmer’s treatment in New York that ultimately caused her death in Florida.
- The complaint was dismissed by the Florida trial court for lack of personal jurisdiction over the New York defendants, despite multiple amended complaints attempting to establish jurisdiction.
- On appeal, Thorpe argued that Florida’s long-arm statute gave the state jurisdiction over the New York defendants because their acts caused injury in Florida and they had minimum contacts with the state.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Personal jurisdiction via long-arm statute Section 48.193(1)(a)6.a | Drs. Yoon and Hwang engaged in “service activities” in Florida by referrals, sharing reports, and billing | No service activities in Florida; all acts occurred in NY, and merely sending reports/bills or referrals does not qualify | No jurisdiction—acts did not constitute service activities in Florida nor occurred at injury time |
| Jurisdiction under long-arm statute Section 48.193(1)(a)6.b | Written reports used in Florida were "processed, serviced, or manufactured" by defendants | Reports are not processed, serviced, or manufactured products/materials under the statute | No jurisdiction—reports do not meet statutory definition; temporal connection not met |
| Jurisdiction under long-arm statute Section 48.193(1)(a)2 (tortious acts in Florida) | Defendants’ malpractice in NY caused injury in Florida, so acts were “within” Florida | Statute focuses on where the act occurred, not where injury is felt | No jurisdiction—tortious act was in NY, not Florida |
| Communications into Florida as basis for jurisdiction | Contact with Florida providers and reports directed into Florida establish jurisdiction | No allegations that reports/communications were directed into Florida or constituted tortious acts | No jurisdiction—communications not shown to be sent into FL, nor were they tortious |
Key Cases Cited
- Venetian Salami Co. v. Parthenais, 554 So. 2d 499 (Fla. 1989) (establishes Florida’s two-step test for personal jurisdiction: statutory basis and minimum contacts)
- Wendt v. Horowitz, 822 So. 2d 1252 (Fla. 2002) (personal jurisdiction may arise from tortious communications directed into Florida, but injury alone is not enough)
- Arch Aluminum & Glass Co., Inc. v. Haney, 964 So. 2d 228 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007) (interprets long-arm statute; geographical focus is on where the act occurred)
- Homeway Furniture Co. of Mount Airy, Inc. v. Horne, 822 So. 2d 533 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002) (addressing statutory prongs for personal jurisdiction and the non-applicability of injury alone)
- Consol. Energy Inc. v. Strumor, 920 So. 2d 829 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006) (review standards for jurisdiction and application of Florida long-arm statute)