971 F.3d 553
6th Cir.2020Background
- Plaintiff Jane Doe was enrolled at Bluegrass Community & Technical College but lived in University of Kentucky (UK) residence halls and used UK campus services.
- Doe paid UK directly for housing, dining, student fees, recreation, and other campus services; the community college has close transfer programs with UK.
- Doe alleges she was raped by a UK student on campus on October 2, 2014; she reported the assault and UK held four disciplinary hearings (initial findings of responsibility were later reversed on appeal; the fourth found the accused not responsible).
- Doe withdrew from classes and UK housing on October 15, 2014 and sued UK under Title IX for deliberate indifference (a Davis claim).
- The district court treated UK’s motion as one for summary judgment, held Doe was not a UK student or participant in a UK educational program and therefore lacked Title IX standing, and entered judgment for UK.
- The Sixth Circuit reversed, holding genuine disputes remain about whether Doe was denied the benefit of an ‘education program or activity’ and remanded for consideration of the merits in light of Kollaritsch.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a non-enrolled individual who lives on campus and pays fees can be treated as a participant in a school's educational program for Title IX standing (Davis claim) | Doe: her on-campus residency, payments, use of UK services, and realistic transfer prospects make her part of UK’s education program | UK: Doe was not enrolled or a participant in UK educational programs and thus lacks Title IX standing | Reversed: Court finds genuine dispute exists whether Doe was denied benefits of a UK education program/activity and that Davis can apply in such close-tie circumstances; remand for merits |
| Whether summary judgment was proper on Doe’s Title IX claim | Doe: factual disputes remain about her relationship to UK and whether she was deprived of program benefits | UK: undisputed facts show she was not a UK student/participant so Title IX claim fails as a matter of law | Summary judgment improper on standing ground; remand to decide merits under governing Davis framework |
| Whether Davis applies to someone not formally enrolled | Doe: Davis should apply where an individual is so closely tied to the university that they are essentially a student | UK: Davis applies only to enrolled students/participants | Court limits expansion but allows Davis claims in unique circumstances where plaintiff is essentially a student; emphasizes requirement that harasser be under school disciplinary authority |
| Requirement that harasser be under the institution’s disciplinary authority | Doe: not disputed; element satisfied here | UK: not disputed | Court reiterates this Davis requirement; parties agree the alleged harasser was a UK student so the requirement is met (not at issue on appeal) |
Key Cases Cited
- Davis v. Monroe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629 (1999) (establishes deliberate-indifference Title IX framework for student-on-student sexual harassment)
- Kollaritsch v. Michigan State Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 944 F.3d 613 (6th Cir. 2019) (clarifies Davis elements and requires actionable harassment after the school's response)
- Vance v. Spencer Cnty. Pub. Sch. Dist., 231 F.3d 253 (6th Cir. 2000) (articulates Davis elements as applied in Sixth Circuit)
- Horner v. Ky. High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 43 F.3d 265 (6th Cir. 1994) (interprets broad scope of Title IX coverage across an institution's programs)
- Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986) (summary judgment burdens on movant/nonmovant)
- Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986) (standard for genuine dispute on summary judgment)