30 F.4th 766
8th Cir.2022Background
- Missouri law (§188.028) required parental consent for abortions for minors but allowed a juvenile-court judicial bypass (self-consent or judicial consent) and the statute’s current text did not require or prohibit pre-hearing parental notification.
- Jane Doe (17) sought a judicial bypass in Randolph County; county clerk Michelle Chapman told her staff and Doe that the judge required parental notification before accepting or hearing a bypass petition.
- Doe ultimately traveled to Illinois, obtained a bypass there, and sued Chapman under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claiming a Fourteenth Amendment violation for imposing pre-hearing parental notice and blocking her ability to apply confidentially.
- Chapman moved for summary judgment asserting quasi-judicial (absolute) immunity (she was following Judge Cooksey’s directions) and qualified immunity; the district court denied summary judgment.
- On appeal the Eighth Circuit affirmed: (1) a genuine dispute of material fact existed whether Chapman acted at the judge’s direction (quasi-judicial immunity denied on summary judgment); and (2) Doe’s right to apply for a bypass without pre-hearing parental notice was clearly established by Supreme Court precedent (qualified immunity denied).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Quasi-judicial immunity for clerk’s refusal to accept a bypass application | Doe: Chapman acted independently by refusing to accept or file without parental notice, so not immune | Chapman: She followed Judge Cooksey’s directions, entitling her to absolute/quasi-judicial immunity | Court: Genuine factual dispute exists (Judge Cooksey’s testimony and habit evidence could support either version); summary judgment on quasi-judicial immunity denied |
| Qualified immunity — was there a clearly established right to apply for a bypass without pre-hearing parental notice? | Doe: Supreme Court precedent (Bellotti) and Eighth Circuit precedent (Ashcroft) clearly establish the right to seek a judicial bypass without prior parental notice | Chapman: Supreme Court hasn’t squarely extended such a rule to notice statutes; circuits are split; Ashcroft is not dispositive for a clerk | Court: Bellotti (and Ashcroft applying it) clearly established minors may seek bypass without pre-hearing parental notice; qualified immunity denied |
| Use of habit/routine-practice evidence at summary judgment | Doe: Judge Cooksey’s statements about his usual practice (not to give pre-filing directions) are admissible habit evidence under Rule 406 and raise a triable issue | Chapman: A lack of memory is insufficient; the judge’s remark is vague and inconclusive | Court: Habit evidence may be considered on summary judgment; a reasonable jury could infer whether Cooksey gave directions; evidence defeated summary judgment on immunity |
Key Cases Cited
- Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979) (minors must be able to seek judicial bypass without prior parental consultation/notice)
- Planned Parenthood of Cent. Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976) (parental-consent statutes require a bypass procedure)
- Ohio v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 497 U.S. 502 (1990) (distinguishes parental-notice from parental-consent statutes)
- Planned Parenthood Ass’n of Kansas City, Mo., Inc. v. Ashcroft, 655 F.2d 848 (8th Cir. 1981) (applied Bellotti to invalidate Missouri pre-hearing notice requirement)
- Planned Parenthood, Sioux Falls Clinic v. Miller, 63 F.3d 1452 (8th Cir. 1995) (parental-notice statutes require a confidential, expeditious bypass mechanism)
- Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986) (summary judgment standard; plaintiff need only present evidence from which a jury might return a verdict)
- Yellow Horse v. Pennington Cty., 225 F.3d 923 (8th Cir. 2000) (habit/routine-practice evidence may be relied on at summary judgment)
- Rogers v. Bruntrager, 841 F.2d 853 (8th Cir. 1988) (clerks have absolute immunity for acts performed at a judge’s direction)