Jane Doe v. City of Memphis, 928 F.3d 481

Background

Three plaintiffs alleged Memphis Police Department (MPD) failed to submit thousands of sexual assault kits (SAKs) for testing; this appeal concerns Jane Doe No. 2 whose kit was not tested until 2013 (assault in 2003).
Plaintiffs sued alleging, inter alia, sex-discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection Clause and sought class certification of women whose SAKs were not tested.
Discovery spanned nearly two years; Plaintiffs served broad interrogatories and document requests seeking SAK-level data and source investigative files. MPD produced summary spreadsheets (15,465 investigations, 2001–2005 data) and produced many documents only after moving for summary judgment.
Defendant moved for summary judgment and to strike class allegations; the district court granted both, concluding Plaintiffs had adequate discovery and could not show commonality.
Plaintiffs filed a Rule 56(d) affidavit saying more discovery (investigative files, depositions, internal emails, representative sampling) was necessary to show discriminatory intent or a pattern; the district court denied further discovery and later denied reconsideration.
The Sixth Circuit majority reversed: it held the district court abused its discretion by granting summary judgment and striking class claims before Plaintiffs had a meaningful opportunity for further targeted discovery, and remanded for additional discovery (including representative sampling of files).

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether district court abused discretion by denying Rule 56(d) discovery before granting summary judgment	Doe: denial deprived her of meaningful discovery; additional files, depositions, and internal docs could show discriminatory intent or effect	City: had produced spreadsheets and some files; Plaintiffs were not diligent and additional discovery would not change the outcome	Reversed — court abused discretion; remand for further discovery (allow representative sampling and related discovery)
Whether summary judgment for Jane Doe No. 2 was proper on Equal Protection sex‑discrimination claim	Doe: needs discovery to show policy/custom or systemic disparate treatment of sexual-assault victims (circumstantial/statistical proof)	City: investigative file for Doe No. 2 and spreadsheets show no animus; summary data sufficient	Reversed — cannot resolve on present record; additional discovery might create genuine issue of material fact
Whether class allegations should be struck for lack of commonality under Rule 23	Doe: discovery might reveal a pattern/practice or common mode of exercising discretion sufficient for commonality and class certification	City: discretion of individual investigators and varied reasons for non-testing preclude commonality; existing record insufficient	Reversed — premature to strike class; additional discovery might establish commonality and identify additional class reps
Whether plaintiffs were diligent in pursuing discovery (Plott factors)	Doe: timely served broad discovery, relied reasonably on City's production schedule and court oversight; withdrawal of a motion to compel was tactical and production continued	City: Plaintiffs could have filed a focused motion to compel and were not diligent; discovery was lengthy and costly	Court: Plaintiffs were not dilatory and were moderately diligent; City was largely unresponsive — factor analysis favors Plaintiffs

Key Cases Cited

Spadafore v. Gardner, 330 F.3d 849 (6th Cir. 2003) (standard of review for summary judgment)
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (U.S. 1986) (summary judgment evidence and inferences)
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (U.S. 1986) (genuine issue for jury standard)
Ball v. Union Carbide Corp., 385 F.3d 713 (6th Cir. 2004) (purpose of Rule 56(d) to secure full opportunity for discovery)
Jones v. Union County, 296 F.3d 417 (6th Cir. 2002) (Equal Protection sex‑discrimination elements)
United States v. Thorpe, 471 F.3d 652 (6th Cir. 2006) (discriminatory effect as circumstantial evidence of intent)
E.M.A. Nationwide, Inc. v. FTC, 767 F.3d 611 (6th Cir. 2014) (abuse‑of‑discretion review for Rule 56(d) denials; courts should construe Rule 56(d) generously)
Plott v. General Motors Corp., 71 F.3d 1190 (6th Cir. 1995) (five Plott factors for evaluating Rule 56(d) discovery requests)
Pilgrim v. Universal Health Card, LLC, 660 F.3d 943 (6th Cir. 2011) (striking class allegations where further factual development could not alter predominance choice‑of‑law problems)
Wal‑Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338 (U.S. 2011) (commonality requires common mode of exercising discretion)
Gallo v. Prudential Residential Servs., Ltd. Partnership, 22 F.3d 1219 (2d Cir. 1994) (circumstantial proof and careful scrutiny when intent is at issue)