Jane Doe v. Brown University, 253 A.3d 389

In Nov. 2013 plaintiff (a Providence College freshman) was drugged and sexually assaulted in a Brown University dorm by three Brown football players; police investigated and cell-phone texts implicated the students.
Plaintiff submitted statements to Brown, requested Title IX relief, and provided forensic drug-test results; Brown notified her of a campus inquiry but later abandoned disciplinary action.
Plaintiff filed an OCR Title IX complaint and sued Brown in federal court asserting Title IX and related state claims; the district court dismissed her Title IX claim because she was not a Brown student, and the First Circuit affirmed.
Plaintiff then sued in Rhode Island Superior Court under the Rhode Island Civil Rights Act (RICRA) and article 1, §2 of the Rhode Island Constitution; Brown moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).
The Superior Court granted dismissal, finding RICRA claims precluded by the federal Title IX dismissal and that the state constitutional antidiscrimination clause does not create a private damages remedy; the Supreme Court of Rhode Island affirmed.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether RICRA claims are precluded by prior federal Title IX dismissal	RICRA claims are independent of Title IX and not barred	RICRA claims rest on Title IX allegations; collateral estoppel applies after final federal judgment	Collateral estoppel applies; RICRA claims predicated on Title IX dismissed
Whether Brown intentionally interfered with plaintiff's contract with Providence College (RICRA theory)	Brown's misconduct materially harmed plaintiff's education and caused withdrawal	Any effect on Providence College relationship was too attenuated; no intentional interference alleged	Dismissed—plaintiff failed to plead intentional interference as matter of law
Whether article 1, §2 (antidiscrimination clause) creates a private cause of action / is self-executing	Clause supplies enforceable rights against entities doing substantial business with state (e.g., Brown)	Clause is non–self-executing and does not create a private damages remedy	Clause is not self-executing; no private right of action under article 1, §2; claim dismissed
Whether Brown is a state actor or "doing business with the state" such that art.1 §2 applies	Brown does substantial business with Rhode Island and is covered	Brown is not a state actor; in any event clause does not create remedy	Court need not decide state-actor status because clause is not self-executing; alternative argument unnecessary

Doe v. Brown University, 270 F. Supp. 3d 556 (D.R.I. 2017) (district court dismissal of Title IX claim)
Doe v. Brown University, 896 F.3d 127 (1st Cir. 2018) (First Circuit affirming Title IX dismissal)
Bandoni v. State, 715 A.2d 580 (R.I. 1998) (framework for when constitutional provisions are self-executing and for judicial restraint in creating remedies)
Mokwenyei v. Rhode Island Hospital, 198 A.3d 17 (R.I. 2018) (standard for Rule 12(b)(6) review and exceptions for considering documents)
Goodrow v. Bank of America, N.A., 184 A.3d 1121 (R.I. 2018) (judicial notice of court records when deciding pleadings challenges)
A.F. Lusi Construction, Inc. v. Rhode Island Convention Ctr. Auth., 934 A.2d 791 (R.I. 2007) (constitutional provision expressing general principles, not enforceable rules)
John Rocchio Corp. v. Pare Eng'g Corp., 201 A.3d 316 (R.I. 2019) (elements for intentional interference with contractual relations)