Jane Doe v. Baptist Primary Care, Inc, 177 So. 3d 669

Plaintiff Jane Doe was diagnosed with HIV in 2006 and treated by physicians employed by Baptist Primary Care (Baptist).
In Oct. 2007 Doe sought a referral and provided new employer-based insurance info; employee Melissa Cotton was assigned to handle the referral.
Cotton disclosed Doe's HIV status to her boyfriend (who worked for Doe's husband’s employer) and later to others at that company; subsequently Doe's husband faced employment consequences and was later told of Doe's condition.
Doe sued: Count I for invasion of privacy (disclosure of private medical information) and Count II for negligent training and supervision of employees.
The trial court initially dismissed Count I without prejudice for failure to state a claim and dismissed Count II with prejudice as a medical-malpractice claim barred by the two-year statute and chapter 766 pre-suit requirements; later the court dismissed Count I with prejudice as a sanction for failing to timely amend.
On appeal the First DCA affirmed dismissal of Count I (appellant failed to challenge the sanction ruling) but reversed dismissal of Count II, holding Count II pleaded ordinary negligence, not medical malpractice.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether dismissal of Count I with prejudice as a sanction was erroneous	Sanction was improper and merits review of Count I on the merits	Sanction appropriate because plaintiff failed to timely amend as ordered	Affirmed — appellant abandoned the issue by failing to brief challenge to the sanction; sanction stands
Whether Count II is governed by medical-malpractice law (two-year statute and chapter 766 pre-suit requirements)	Count II alleges negligent training/supervision distinct from medical diagnosis/treatment, so ordinary negligence applies	Allegations arise from medical care environment and implicate professional standard of care; thus medical malpractice law applies	Reversed — complaint alleges simple negligence unrelated to medical diagnosis/treatment; statute of limitations and chapter 766 pre-suit rules do not bar the claim

J.B. v. Sacred Heart Hosp. of Pensacola, 635 So. 2d 945 (Fla. 1994) (distinguishes injuries arising from medical diagnosis/treatment from ordinary negligence and explains when chapter 766 applies)
Silva v. Southwest Fla. Blood Bank, Inc., 601 So. 2d 1184 (Fla. 1992) (interpreting scope of "diagnosis, treatment, or care" for statute of limitations purposes)
Integrated Health Care Servs., Inc. v. Lang-Redway, 840 So. 2d 974 (Fla. 2002) (chapter 766 construed to favor access to courts; guidance on applying malpractice statutes)
Locker v. United Pharm. Grp., Inc., 46 So. 3d 1126 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010) (standard of review and pleading rules on motions to dismiss)
Dr. Navarro's Vein Ctr. of Palm Beach, Inc. v. Miller, 22 So. 3d 776 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009) (courts must decide whether complaint sounds in simple or medical negligence by applying law to well-pleaded facts)
Bell v. Indian River Mem'l Hosp., 778 So. 2d 1030 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001) (example of hospital-related negligent acts treated as ordinary negligence)
Lynn v. Mount Sinai Med. Ctr., Inc., 692 So. 2d 1002 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997) (not every wrongful act in a medical setting is medical malpractice)
Liles v. P.I.A. Medfield, Inc., 681 So. 2d 711 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995) (distinguishing ordinary negligence from medical malpractice)
Stackhouse v. Emerson, 611 So. 2d 1365 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993) (plaintiff may plead intentional torts independent of medical diagnosis, care, or treatment)