Jane Doe No. 1 v. Backpage.Com, LLC, 817 F.3d 12

Background

Three women (sued pseudonymously) allege they were sex-trafficked as minors via ads posted in Backpage.com's "Escorts" category and that Backpage structured its site and policies to facilitate trafficking.
Plaintiffs allege Backpage profited from paid adult postings and "Sponsored Ads," stripped photo metadata, allowed anonymous/obfuscated contact/payment info, and used moderation rules that enabled workarounds.
Plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint asserting: (1) federal TVPRA and Massachusetts trafficking claims; (2) Massachusetts Chapter 93A consumer-protection claims based on alleged misrepresentations to NCMEC/law enforcement; and (3) state-law unauthorized-use-of-image and one copyright claim.
District court dismissed all claims under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6); plaintiffs appealed.
The First Circuit affirmed: it held §230(c)(1) bars the trafficking and related claims that treat Backpage as the publisher/speaker of third-party content; Chapter 93A claims were dismissed for insufficiently pleaded causation; state image and copyright claims failed on their merits or for lack of plausible damages/relief.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether §230(c)(1) bars TVPRA and trafficking-related claims based on site design/policies	Backpage engaged in an "affirmative course of conduct" facilitating trafficking distinct from editorial publishing, so §230 inapplicable	§230(c)(1) immunizes provider for decisions about how to publish, structure, and operate third‑party content	§230(c)(1) bars these claims: site policies/operations are publisher functions protected by §230(c)(1)
Whether §230(c)(2) or §230(e)(1) saves plaintiffs' claims (good‑faith screening or "enforcement" exception)	Plaintiffs: district court ignored need to probe Backpage's good faith; §230(e)(1) should not bar TVPRA civil enforcement	Backpage: §230(c)(2) is distinct and §230(e)(1) refers to criminal enforcement only, not private civil suits	§230(c)(2) not implicated; §230(e)(1) does not carve out civil TVPRA suits — criminal enforcement only
Whether Chapter 93A claims plausibly allege causation from Backpage's alleged misrepresentations to NCMEC/law enforcement	Plaintiffs: misrepresentations delayed enforcement/competition, increased Backpage market share, foreseeably increasing risk of trafficking	Backpage: alleged causal chain is speculative and attenuated	Dismissed: causation too speculative; facts pleaded insufficient to plausibly connect misrepresentations to plaintiffs' injuries
Whether state unauthorized‑use‑of‑image or copyright claims permit relief against Backpage	Plaintiffs: Backpage profited from ads using their images and thus misappropriated and infringed rights	Backpage: mere publication/conduit for third‑party ads is not deliberate commercial appropriation; copyright damages/relief not supported	Image‑use claims dismissed: publisher who merely carries third‑party ads did not appropriate likeness for trade; copyright claim dismissed for failure to plead actual damages or likelihood of future infringement

Key Cases Cited

Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997) (§230 protects providers from being treated as publisher/speaker of third‑party content)
Universal Commc'n Sys., Inc. v. Lycos, Inc., 478 F.3d 413 (1st Cir. 2007) (site operational/policy decisions are publisher functions covered by §230)
Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F.3d 1096 (9th Cir. 2009) (distinguishing promises/contractual obligations from publisher immunity)
Doe v. MySpace, Inc., 528 F.3d 413 (5th Cir. 2008) (claims that a site failed to implement safety measures still treated as publisher‑based and barred by §230)
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (plausibility pleading standard)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (separating well‑pleaded facts from conclusory allegations in plausibility analysis)
SEC v. Tambone, 597 F.3d 436 (1st Cir. 2010) (standard for reviewing Rule 12(b)(6) dismissals)