75 F.4th 655
6th Cir.2023Background
- Kentucky enacted a statute banning certain sex‑transition medical care for minors (Ky. Rev. Stat. § 311.372), prompting a district‑court preliminary injunction against enforcement. The district court later stayed that injunction. Plaintiffs moved to lift the stay.
- The Sixth Circuit considered the motion by applying the four‑factor stay/preliminary‑injunction framework (likelihood of success, irreparable harm, balance of harms, public interest).
- The majority treated L.W. ex rel. Williams v. Skrmetti (a Sixth Circuit decision upholding stay of a Tennessee ban) as controlling because Kentucky’s ban targets the same conduct and the plaintiffs raise the same Equal Protection and Due Process claims.
- Plaintiffs emphasized two differences from Skrmetti: Kentucky requires immediate initiation of a weaning period for patients on treatment, and some Kentucky officials oppose enforcing the ban, which they say increases imminent harm and weakens the State’s interest.
- The majority rejected those distinctions: (1) it relied on the factual finding in Skrmetti that doctors would begin weaning immediately, so Kentucky’s immediate‑wean text does not change the harms analysis; (2) disagreement by some state officials does not diminish the Commonwealth’s sovereign interest in enforcing laws enacted by its legislature. The court therefore declined to lift the stay.
- Judge Helene N. White dissented: she would lift the stay (at least for minors already receiving banned treatments) because Kentucky’s immediate‑wean requirement poses greater risk of irreparable harm and plaintiffs are likely to succeed on the merits (sex‑based discrimination).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the Sixth Circuit should lift the district court’s stay of a preliminary injunction against Kentucky’s ban | The stay should be lifted and injunction restored because the ban is likely unconstitutional and causes imminent harm | Skrmetti controls; the stay should remain because the balance of factors favors enforcement | Stay remains; declined to lift the district court’s stay |
| Likelihood of success on the merits (Equal Protection / Due Process) | The statute discriminates on the basis of sex and likely violates constitutional protections | Same claims were unlikely to succeed in Skrmetti; identical analysis applies here | Court held plaintiffs’ likelihood of success is not sufficient to warrant lifting the stay (Skrmetti controls) |
| Irreparable harm / weaning requirement | Kentucky’s law forces immediate weaning, producing immediate irreparable harm to minors | Skrmetti’s record showed doctors would begin weaning immediately there too, so the harm is comparable and not dispositive | Majority: immediate‑wean language does not change the harm analysis; stay remains |
| State interest / effect of dissenting officials | Some Kentucky officials oppose enforcing the ban, which purportedly weakens the State’s interest | A State’s enacted law reflects sovereign interests regardless of some officials’ disagreement | State interest stands; disagreement by officials does not alter analysis |
Key Cases Cited
- Roberts v. Neace, 958 F.3d 409 (6th Cir. 2020) (four‑factor test for emergency relief / preliminary injunction stays)
- Obama for Am. v. Husted, 697 F.3d 423 (6th Cir. 2012) (likelihood of success is often the determinative factor)
- Cameron v. EMW Women’s Surgical Ctr., P.S.C., 142 S. Ct. 1002 (2022) (State has sovereign interest in enforcing laws)
- Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592 (1982) (principles on state sovereign interests)
- Mich. Coalition of Radioactive Material Users, Inc. v. Griepentrog, 945 F.2d 150 (6th Cir. 1991) (relationship between probability of success and amount of irreparable injury in preliminary injunction analysis)
- Cameron v. Beshear, 628 S.W.3d 61 (Ky. 2021) (Kentucky authority on legislative policymaking and executive roles)