Janard Orange v. State
149 So. 3d 74
| Fla. Dist. Ct. App. | 2014Background
- In April 2009, 16‑year‑old Janard Orange and others robbed a group of students after a school event; one victim, Gregory Smith (16), was shot and killed. Orange was identified at trial as the shooter.
- Orange was convicted by a jury of first‑degree murder, four counts of robbery with a firearm, and one count of assault; sentences for robbery counts included life terms with mandatory minimums; murder received mandatory life without parole.
- Prosecution relied on testimony from co‑participants and a middle‑school behavioral counselor who established that Orange and the victim knew each other and that the victim had been fearful.
- Defense objected to portions of the counselor’s testimony (relevance/hearsay); the court heard the counselor outside the jury’s presence, allowed limited testimony, then (at defense request) permitted more detail and reopened the counselor’s direct examination.
- On appeal Orange challenged (1) admission of the counselor’s testimony and (2) imposition of mandatory life sentences for a juvenile in light of Miller, Graham, and related decisions; the Fourth DCA affirmed convictions, reversed the mandatory LWOP murder sentence and remanded for resentencing under Miller, and affirmed life sentences on the robbery convictions.
Issues
| Issue | Appellant's Argument | State's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Admissibility of counselor’s initial testimony (relevance/prejudice) | Testimony was irrelevant and unduly prejudicial (should be excluded) | Testimony relevant to show preexisting relationship and non‑random nature of the shooting | Admission not an abuse of discretion: relevant to premeditation, limited, not unduly prejudicial |
| Admission of reopened direct (victim’s fear/hearsay) | Reopened testimony was inadmissible hearsay and state elicited victim’s state‑of‑mind improperly | Defense invited/waived objection by asking court to allow fuller context; any hearsay objection was abandoned | Not preserved on appeal and, in any event, defense expressly requested the additional testimony; appellate relief denied |
| Mandatory life without parole for murder of juvenile (Miller) | Mandatory LWOP for a 16‑year‑old violates the Eighth Amendment (Miller) and requires resentencing | Argues for statutory revival to permit parole after 25 years; remedies vary among districts | Miller governs: mandatory juvenile LWOP invalid; reverse and remand for resentencing where court must consider youth factors; trial court may still impose LWOP after individualized consideration |
| Life without parole for juvenile on robbery convictions committed with a homicide in same episode (Graham conflict) | Juvenile cannot receive LWOP for nonhomicide offenses even if committed in same episode as a homicide | Where homicide occurred in same episode, nonhomicide LWOP may be justified; Lawton rationale supports upholding such sentences | Fourth DCA follows Lawton: LWOP for the robbery counts not illegal here; affirmed, but notes Florida Supreme Court is resolving inter‑district conflict |
Key Cases Cited
- Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012) (mandatory life without parole for juveniles violates Eighth Amendment; sentencer must consider youth mitigation)
- Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010) (Eighth Amendment prohibits LWOP for juveniles convicted of nonhomicide offenses)
- Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (death penalty unconstitutional for crimes committed as juveniles)
- Lawton v. State, 109 So. 3d 825 (Fla. 3d DCA 2013) (interprets Graham to permit LWOP on nonhomicide convictions when committed in same episode with homicide)
- McDuffie v. State, 970 So. 2d 312 (Fla. 2007) (standard of review for evidentiary rulings; trial court discretion limited by rules of evidence)