Jan Van Dusen v. City of Oakland, 678 F. App'x 582

Background

Jan Van Dusen, an attorney, sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging federal and related state-law claims stemming from an investigation, prosecution, and state-court conviction for animal cruelty (seizure of cats and medication issues).
The district court dismissed her federal claims and declined supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims; Van Dusen appealed pro se.
Key dismissed federal claims included conspiracy, unreasonable seizure, and illegal seizure tied to the cat seizure.
The district court also dismissed an unreasonable-seizure claim regarding medication on issue-preclusion grounds based on prior criminal proceedings.
Claims against non-profit defendants were dismissed for failure to allege action under color of state law.
The district court denied leave to amend (futility) and denied recusal; the Ninth Circuit affirmed in all respects and denied other procedural challenges.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether § 1983 claims that challenge seizures are barred by Heck because they would invalidate a state conviction	Van Dusen argued her § 1983 claims could proceed though related to her conviction	Defendants argued success would necessarily imply invalidity of conviction, so Heck bars the suit absent invalidation	Affirmed: Heck bars those claims because Van Dusen did not allege her conviction was invalidated
Whether the unreasonable-seizure claim about medication is precluded by prior criminal proceedings	Van Dusen contended the medication seizure claim could be litigated in § 1983	Defendants invoked issue preclusion from Fourth Amendment determinations at the suppression hearing	Affirmed: claim barred by issue preclusion under Ayers applying California law
Whether non-profit defendants acted under color of state law for § 1983 liability	Van Dusen alleged non-profits were liable under § 1983	Defendants argued they were private actors not acting under color of state law	Affirmed: dismissal proper—plaintiff failed to plead state action sufficient for § 1983
Whether the district court abused discretion by denying leave to amend, refusing supplemental jurisdiction, or denying recusal	Van Dusen argued she should get another amendment, keep state claims in federal court, and that judge should recuse	Defendants defended district court’s discretionary rulings as proper	Affirmed: denial of leave to amend was not an abuse (futility); declining supplemental jurisdiction was proper; recusal denial was correct (no demonstrated bias)

Key Cases Cited

Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994) (a § 1983 claim that would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction is barred unless the conviction has been invalidated)
Beets v. County of Los Angeles, 669 F.3d 1038 (9th Cir. 2012) (standard for reviewing dismissals under Rule 12(b)(6) and Heck questions)
Ayers v. City of Richmond, 895 F.2d 1267 (9th Cir. 1990) (giving preclusive effect to Fourth Amendment determinations made in suppression hearings)
Price v. State of Hawaii, 939 F.2d 702 (9th Cir. 1991) (private parties generally do not act under color of state law for § 1983 purposes)
Ascon Props., Inc. v. Mobil Oil Co., 866 F.2d 1149 (9th Cir. 1989) (standard for denying leave to amend; amendment may be denied as futile)
Ove v. Gwinn, 264 F.3d 817 (9th Cir. 2001) (district courts may decline supplemental jurisdiction after dismissing federal claims)
Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540 (1994) (judicial rulings alone almost never constitute a valid basis for recusal)