Jamie McKnight v. Aimbridge Employee Service Cor
712 F. App'x 165
| 3rd Cir. | 2017Background
- McKnight, an African‑American employee at the Hilton Garden Inn (managed by Aimbridge), sought transfer from kitchen (line cook) to a banquet position and completed only one day of a required three‑week banquet training.
- Aimbridge required three weeks of training before employees were qualified to work in banquet roles; McKnight missed scheduled training dates and admitted little follow‑up between August and December 2014.
- After complaints to the general manager and an EEOC filing, Aimbridge held an evaluation, issued a written warning/development plan, sent McKnight home early (paid), removed him from the kitchen schedule, failed to schedule him in banquet shifts, and ultimately terminated him for alleged job abandonment.
- McKnight sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and Title VII for racial discrimination and retaliation; the District Court granted summary judgment for Aimbridge dismissing all claims.
- On appeal, McKnight argued the District Court applied incorrect standards, overlooked evidence that Aimbridge thwarted his training, and failed to address a post‑transfer scheduling discrimination claim; the Third Circuit affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether McKnight was qualified for the banquet position | McKnight argued he was qualified and Aimbridge refused to schedule him for training despite repeated requests | Aimbridge argued the hotel required completion of a three‑week training prerequisite, which McKnight did not complete | Court: McKnight was not qualified; failure to complete mandated training justified summary judgment |
| Whether failure to schedule after transfer supported discrimination claim | McKnight said Aimbridge granted transfer but then refused to schedule him, showing animus | Aimbridge argued plaintiff failed to show supervisors had discriminatory animus or that scheduling decisions were motivated by race | Court: Aimbridge raised the issue in its motion; McKnight failed to rebut lack of animus; claim dismissed |
| Whether evaluation, warning, development plan, and being sent home constitute adverse actions for retaliation | McKnight contended these actions could dissuade a reasonable worker from complaining and thus are adverse | Aimbridge argued such actions (evaluations, plans, paid early departure) are not materially adverse absent economic or term‑and‑condition changes; conceded some actions (schedule removal, termination) were adverse but offered nondiscriminatory reasons | Court: Even assuming some acts were adverse, McKnight failed to show pretext or that decisionmakers knew of protected activity; no genuine issue of material fact on causation/pretext |
| Standard for proving retaliation / pretext at summary judgment | McKnight argued the District Court applied a too‑stringent but‑for standard | Aimbridge relied on Fuentes/Moore framework requiring evidence that employer's reasons are false and retaliation was real reason | Court: Applied settled Third Circuit law (Fuentes/Moore); plaintiff must create fact dispute that employer’s nondiscriminatory reasons are unworthy of credence; McKnight failed to meet this burden |
Key Cases Cited
- Mandel v. M & Q Packaging Corp., 706 F.3d 157 (3d Cir. 2013) (elements of prima facie discrimination claim)
- Makky v. Chertoff, 541 F.3d 205 (3d Cir. 2008) (prima facie framework citation)
- Krouse v. Am. Sterilizer Co., 126 F.3d 494 (3d Cir. 1997) (retaliation proof requires showing employer's explanation was false and retaliation was real reason)
- Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 759 (3d Cir. 1994) (summary judgment burden to show employer's nondiscriminatory reason is unworthy of credence)
- Moore v. City of Philadelphia, 461 F.3d 331 (3d Cir. 2006) (retaliation prima facie elements and causal link discussion)
- Ezold v. Wolf, Block, Schorr and Solis‑Cohen, 983 F.2d 509 (3d Cir. 1992) (inferential analysis of employer proffered reasons)
- McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) (burden‑shifting framework for discrimination claims)
