Jametsky v. Olsen
179 Wash. 2d 756
Wash.2014Background
- Jametsky faced foreclosure risk after job loss and $10,000+ in back taxes; he sought a loan against his home due to equity; he was introduced to Flynn and Haber who arranged a deal that purported to be a loan but resulted in Jametsky deeding his home to Olsen for $100,000 and signing a lease with buyback option; Jametsky received only about $4,697 while intermediaries took commissions; after months, he learned there was no loan and that he had transferred title; eviction notices followed; Court denied DPCA relief, Court of Appeals affirmed; Washington Supreme Court reversed, holding property can be distressed before a certificate of delinquency and remanding for factual inquiry to determine distress.
- The act protects distressed homeowners from equity skimming and predatory schemes, and is remedial in nature requiring liberal construction in favor of consumer protection.
- The DPCA applies to transactions involving distressed homes or distressed homeowners and requires a factual inquiry into whether a property is distressed before DPCA protections apply.
- The defendant argued for a bright-line rule tying distress to issuance of a certificate of delinquency; Jametsky and the AG urged plain meaning and liberal construction; the Court adopted plain meaning but liberal, case-by-case inquiry.
- The case remands to evaluate whether the property was distressed under RCW 61.34.020(2)(a) by considering relevant factors without requiring a certificate of delinquency.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a certificate of delinquency is required before a property is distressed under RCW 61.34.020(2)(a) | Jametsky/AG: distress can exist before delinquency certificate; plain meaning supports protection. | Olsen/Jametsky: distress only after certificate of delinquency. | Distressed status can exist before a certificate; require factual inquiry. |
| Is RCW 84.64.050 a related statute that defines distress | Not a related statute; should not narrow distress. | 84.64.050 demonstrates narrow distress definition. | Not a related statute; does not define distress. |
| How should “at risk of loss due to nonpayment of taxes” be construed? | Plain meaning: vulnerable, protective interpretation. | Narrow interpretation favored by respondents. | Plain meaning applied; liberal, case-specific inquiry required. |
| Is the DPCA a remedial statute to be liberally construed in favor of consumers? | Yes, to curb equity skimming and predatory schemes. | Standard statutory interpretation applies. | DPCA construed liberally in favor of homeowners. |
| What framework should trial courts use to determine distress under DPCA? | Balancing multiple factors to determine at-risk status. | Limited criteria tied to certificate; unclear. | Provide nonexclusive factors and starting framework for factual inquiry. |
Key Cases Cited
- Campbell & Gwinn, LLC v. Dept. of Ecology, 146 Wn.2d 1 (Wash. 2002) (statutory interpretation and liberal construction of remedial statutes)
- State v. Breazeale, 144 Wn.2d 829 (Wash. 2001) (interpretation and de novo review of legal questions)
- State v. J.M., 144 Wn.2d 472 (Wash. 2001) (standards for statutory interpretation in criminal context (briefly cited))
- Int’l Ass’n of Fire Fighters v. City of Everett, 146 Wn.2d 29 (Wash. 2002) (remedial statute, liberal construction in public interest)
- Carlsen v. Global Client Solutions, LLC, 171 Wn.2d 486 (Wash. 2011) (remedial consumer protection statute; liberal interpretation)
- State v. Pike, 118 Wn.2d 585 (Wash. 1992) (consumer protection statutes foster fair dealing)
- Underwood v. Truck & Auto, 32 Wn. App. 4 (Wash. App. 1982) (illustrative of statutory construction approach)
