James X. Bormes v. United States, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 14042

Plaintiff James Bormes paid a federal court filing fee via pay.gov and received an email receipt showing the last four digits of his credit card number and the card expiration date.
Bormes sued the United States under the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), alleging the receipt violated 15 U.S.C. §1681c(g)(1).
The FCRA defines “person” to include "government or governmental subdivision or agency" (15 U.S.C. §1681a(b)); Bormes sought damages under §§1681n/o.
The United States defended on sovereign-immunity grounds and, alternately, on the merits (arguing the email receipt was not a printed receipt “provided … at the point of the sale or transaction”).
The Supreme Court remanded the case to the Seventh Circuit to decide whether FCRA itself waives the Federal Government’s immunity to damages under §1681n.
The Seventh Circuit held the statutory definition of “person” waives the United States’ sovereign immunity for damages under the FCRA but ruled for the United States on the merits: the email receipt did not meet §1681c(g)(1)’s “printed…at the point of the sale or transaction” requirement.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether FCRA waives the United States’ sovereign immunity for damages	FCRA’s definition of “person” includes government, so §1681n authorizes damages against the U.S.	The 1996 amendment expanding liability to all “persons” does not demonstrate Congress intended to waive sovereign immunity; punitive damages tradition precludes application to U.S.	The court held §1681a(b)’s definition of “person” waives the U.S. sovereign immunity for FCRA damages claims.
Whether the receipt violated §1681c(g)(1) (printing limitations)	The email receipt disclosed both the last digits and expiration date, violating the provision	The receipt was electronic (not “printed” by the government) and was not provided at the point of sale or transaction; any printing was Bormes’s own act	The court held the emailed receipt did not constitute a receipt “printed … at the point of the sale or transaction,” so no statutory violation on the merits.

Swain v. Pressley, 430 U.S. 372 (authority that statutory text, not committee reports, controls)
Harrison v. PPG Industries, 446 U.S. 578 (same principle about statutory text)
Department of Energy v. Ohio, 503 U.S. 607 (unequivocal statutory language required to waive sovereign immunity)
Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Community, 134 S. Ct. 2024 (remedy limits do not justify judicial rewriting of statutory text)
Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313 (federal government may enforce federal statutes against states)
Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (limits on Congress’s power to subject states to damages)
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682 (federal statutes can apply to the United States even if states enjoy immunity)
Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418 (application of federal statutory rules to federal actors)
Shlahtichman v. 1-800 Contacts, Inc., 615 F.3d 794 (7th Cir. decision treating electronic/email receipts as outside §1681c(g)(1))
Simonoff v. Expedia, Inc., 643 F.3d 1202 (9th Cir. agreement with Shlahtichman)
van Straaten v. Shell Oil Products Co., 678 F.3d 486 (7th Cir. applied §1681c(g) according to its text)
Massachusetts Mutual Ins. Co. v. Ludwig, 426 U.S. 479 (defendant may raise alternative defenses on appeal without cross‑appeal)