James Wilson Douglas, L.C. v. Jennifer S. Morton, 16-1144

Petitioner (attorney James Wilson Douglas, L.C.) sued respondent (Jennifer Morton) in Braxton County for unpaid attorney’s fees after withdrawing from her 2015 divorce case.
Summons and complaint were returned indicating personal service; respondent did not answer and petitioner obtained default judgment in May 2015.
Respondent moved to set aside the default judgment in July 2015, asserting she had not been served and first learned of the case when she received the default-judgment order.
The circuit court initially set aside the default judgment in February 2016 to allow a trial on the merits, then after further hearings reaffirmed setting aside the default judgment following an evidentiary hearing.
Petitioner filed multiple motions for reconsideration and stays; the circuit court denied petitioner’s November 23, 2016 motions, and petitioner appealed only the denial of those motions arguing the court abused its discretion in vacating the default judgment.
The Supreme Court of Appeals affirmed, holding the circuit court did not abuse its discretion given lack of prejudice to petitioner, respondent’s timely Rule 60(b) motion, meritorious defenses, significance of the amount at stake, and limited intransigence.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the circuit court abused its discretion in setting aside the default judgment under Rule 60(b)	Douglas argued the court improperly vacated a valid default judgment and should have denied relief	Morton argued she was never served, filed a timely Rule 60(b) motion, and showed excusable neglect plus meritorious defenses	Court affirmed: no abuse of discretion — factors favored vacatur (no undue prejudice, meritorious defenses, reasonable timing, significant stakes, limited intransigence)

Matz v. Corna & Co., Inc., 206 W.Va. 40, 521 S.E.2d 235 (1999) (courts favor trials on the merits over default judgments)
Lexon Ins. Co. v. Cnty. Council of Berkeley Cty., 235 W.Va. 47, 770 S.E.2d 547 (2015) (standard of review for vacating default judgments: abuse of discretion)
Parsons v. Consol. Gas Supply Corp., 163 W.Va. 464, 256 S.E.2d 758 (1979) (factors for evaluating Rule 60(b) motions to vacate defaults)
Hardwood Group v. Larocco, 219 W.Va. 56, 631 S.E.2d 614 (2006) (Rule 60(b) relief requires showing one of the enumerated grounds and consideration of Parsons factors)
White v. Berryman, 187 W.Va. 323, 418 S.E.2d 917 (1992) (strength of excusable neglect affects appropriateness of relief from default)