36 F.4th 737
7th Cir.2022Background
- In August 1998 James Westray and Keith Cook committed an armed robbery at Hurley’s Show Bar in Williamson County, Illinois; Cook and Westray each fired shots that killed Elizabeth Opat t.
- Westray pleaded open guilty to first‑degree and felony murder; a two‑phase jury found an aggravating factor and, after the mitigation phase (three defense witnesses: Westray, his mother, and a high‑school friend), unanimously found no sufficient mitigation and sentenced him to death.
- On direct appeal the case was remanded for deficient Rule 605(b) admonitions; new counsel (Brian Lewis) filed an amended motion to withdraw the guilty plea alleging the plea was not knowing and that trial counsel (Larry Broeking) failed to investigate mitigation.
- The trial court denied the motion; Westray’s death sentence was later commuted to life imprisonment by the Governor; state postconviction relief was dismissed as moot and thereafter denied on appeal.
- Westray filed a §2254 habeas petition alleging (1) Broeking was ineffective at sentencing for failing to investigate/present mitigation and (2) Lewis was ineffective on remand; the district court denied relief but granted a COA limited to certain issues, and the Seventh Circuit affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Was trial counsel constitutionally ineffective at sentencing for failing to investigate/present mitigation? | Broeking failed to reasonably investigate or present available mitigation (school, medical, legal records; more witnesses); more evidence would likely have lessened the sentence. | State: AEDPA deference applies; aggravation evidence was overwhelming; commutation requires showing a reasonable probability of a sentence less than life. | Denied — under AEDPA and Strickland no prejudice shown; unlikely additional mitigation would have produced a term of years. |
| Was counsel on remand ineffective for failing to raise Broeking’s sentencing ineffectiveness or request resentencing? | Lewis failed to raise or adequately press the sentencing‑ineffectiveness claim on remand. | Lewis did raise an ineffective assistance claim in the amended motion; moreover, if Broeking was not ineffective, Lewis cannot be. | Denied — the amended motion did raise the claim and the underlying Strickland claim fails, so no relief. |
| Did the state court adjudicate the sentencing‑ineffectiveness claim on the merits (triggering AEDPA deference)? | Westray contends the amended motion only sought to withdraw the plea (guilt phase), so state court did not adjudicate sentencing IAC on the merits. | The amended motion explicitly alleged failure to investigate "mitigation evidence," commonly understood as sentencing mitigation; thus it was adjudicated and AEDPA applies. | Held: The state court adjudicated the claim on the merits; AEDPA deference applies. |
| Is an evidentiary hearing required in federal habeas to develop mitigation evidence? | Westray requested an evidentiary hearing to develop mitigation facts. | Pinholster/AEDPA limit review to the state‑court record; no statutory exception authorizes a federal hearing here. | Denied — AEDPA/Pinholster bar a federal evidentiary hearing; abuse of discretion not shown. |
Key Cases Cited
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (establishes two‑prong ineffective assistance standard)
- Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86 (standard for AEDPA deference and "so lacking in justification" language)
- Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170 (limits federal habeas review to the state‑court record)
- Johnson v. Williams, 568 U.S. 289 (presumption that state court adjudicated a claim on the merits)
- Porter v. McCollum, 558 U.S. 30 (totality of mitigation evidence/reweighing for Strickland prejudice)
- Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (use of mitigation in prejudice analysis)
- Griffin v. Pierce, 622 F.3d 831 (7th Cir.) (commutation context; mitigation IAC review)
- Richardson v. Lemke, 745 F.3d 258 (7th Cir.) (commutation requires showing likely sentence less than life)
- Mertz v. Williams, 771 F.3d 1035 (7th Cir.) (applies Richardson rule to require term‑of‑years benchmark after commutation)