231 So. 3d 1024
Miss. Ct. App.2016Background
- On July 3, 2009, James Wesley Scott unlawfully entered Danielle Landry’s home, grabbed and dragged her toward a bedroom, tore at her clothing, and made sexual statements; Landry later escaped and ran for help. Scott also forced Landry into her car and restrained her before she fled. Police recovered Landry’s car and found Scott’s identification at the scene; a DNA report later matched blood at the scene to Scott and Landry.
- Scott was indicted (Sept. 26, 2011) for attempted rape, kidnapping, and burglary of a dwelling; arraigned March 14, 2012; trial occurred Aug. 18–19, 2014. He was convicted on all counts and sentenced as a habitual offender to three consecutive life terms without parole.
- Pretrial delays included a recusal of the original judge, replacement of counsel, and long periods attributable largely to Scott or his counsel; Scott filed multiple pro se and counsel-filed motions to dismiss for speedy-trial violations shortly before trial.
- At trial the court excluded portions of defense witness John Barnes’s testimony as irrelevant or hearsay; the State introduced DNA results and physical evidence (broken kitchen door, glass, blood trail) and eyewitness testimony (Landry, a neighbor witness, and investigators).
- Posttrial Scott raised multiple claims on appeal: exclusion of Barnes’s testimony, defective jury instructions (S‑1, S‑6), error in kidnapping instruction (S‑11A), denial of continuance re: untimely DNA disclosure, insufficiency/weight of evidence, statutory and constitutional speedy‑trial violations, and assorted claims of suppression/perjured testimony and Confrontation Clause violations. The Court of Appeals affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Scott's Argument | State's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Exclusion of Barnes’s testimony | Excluding Barnes’s testimony about prior drug use and a statement by Landry prevented presentation of defendant’s theory (he sought money for drugs, not rape) | Testimony was irrelevant or hearsay and lacked proper foundation; exclusion within trial court’s discretion | Affirmed: exclusion proper — prior drug use irrelevant and Landry’s out‑of‑court statement was hearsay not covered by exceptions or proper impeachment predicate |
| Jury instruction S‑1 (attempted rape) | S‑1 failed to state essential elements by omitting definition/reference to "forcible sexual intercourse" | Instruction tracked statutory attempt elements and supplemented by S‑2 defining attempt | Affirmed: S‑1 sufficiently stated attempt elements; no plain error |
| Jury instruction S‑6 (burglary — underlying crime identified) | S‑6 did not include forcible‑sexual‑intercourse language for the underlying offense | Instruction need only identify the specific underlying crime (rape) not restate its elements | Affirmed: S‑6 adequate to identify intent to commit rape when entering dwelling |
| Instruction S‑11A (kidnapping — slight movement/time language) | S‑11A improperly commented on weight of evidence by stating confinement/asportation of any slight duration is sufficient | Instruction accurately stated law that slight movement/brief confinement may support kidnapping when not merely incidental | Affirmed: S‑11A proper when read with other instructions |
| Denial of continuance / admission of DNA (untimely disclosure) | Late disclosure of DNA report (night before trial) prejudiced defense; requested continuance | State received report late as well, defense knew DNA testing was sought earlier; DNA was cumulative and not prejudicial | Affirmed: trial court did not abuse discretion; any Rule 9.04 issue harmless |
| Sufficiency and weight of evidence | Evidence insufficient / verdict against overwhelming weight | Physical evidence, eyewitness testimony, and DNA supported convictions | Affirmed: evidence sufficient and verdict not against overwhelming weight |
| Speedy‑trial (statutory 270 days and constitutional) | Delays between arrest/indictment/arraignment and trial violated statutory and Sixth Amendment rights | Many delays attributable to defendant or neutral; defendant did not timely assert right; no demonstrable prejudice | Affirmed: no statutory or constitutional speedy‑trial violation after apportioning delays and applying Barker factors |
| Suppression / perjured testimony / confrontation claims | State suppressed Landry’s police statement, used perjured testimony, denied ability to confront prior statements | No evidence State knowingly used perjured testimony; lost records not shown to be intentionally destroyed or materially exculpatory; defendant cross‑examined witnesses | Affirmed: claims meritless; Confrontation Clause not violated |
Key Cases Cited
- Carpenter v. State, 132 So. 3d 1053 (Miss. Ct. App.) (standard of review for admission/exclusion of evidence)
- Clark v. State, 40 So. 3d 531 (Miss.) (defendant’s right to present a defense limited by evidentiary rules)
- Harden v. State, 465 So. 2d 321 (Miss.) (elements of attempted rape under statutory attempt language)
- Henderson v. State, 660 So. 2d 220 (Miss.) (attempt instruction must include failure to consummate language)
- Armstead v. State, 716 So. 2d 576 (Miss.) (clarification of Henderson re: language required in attempt instruction)
- Cuevas v. State, 338 So. 2d 1236 (Miss.) (asportation/confinement sufficient for kidnapping when not merely incidental)
- Conner v. State, 138 So. 3d 143 (Miss.) (burglary instruction must identify underlying intended crime)
- Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (U.S.) (four‑factor balancing test for constitutional speedy‑trial claims)