James W. Brown v. Elmer Stanley
2014 R.I. LEXIS 15
R.I.2014Background
- On Good Friday 2005, Mary Cummings, a walker in a charitable Good Friday Walk organized for Project Hope and the Diocesan Bureau, was struck and severely injured by a Bluelinx tractor-trailer driven by James Brown; Cummings later settled with Bluelinx/driver for $1,450,000 and released all joint tortfeasors.
- Bluelinx sued Project Hope, the Diocesan Bureau, and Elmer Stanley for contribution, alleging defendants had assumed a duty to protect walkers by controlling traffic during the event.
- At trial the jury found defendants negligent and apportioned 20% fault to them; defendants then renewed a Rule 50 motion for judgment as a matter of law and alternatively sought a new trial.
- The trial justice granted the renewed Rule 50 motion, concluding as a matter of law that defendants owed no legal duty to Cummings and, even if a duty had arisen, it ended when Cummings declined assistance and traffic had been waved on.
- Bluelinx appealed the grant of judgment as a matter of law; the Rhode Island Supreme Court reviewed the duty question de novo and affirmed the Superior Court.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether defendants owed a legal duty to protect walkers on an abutting public road | Defendants assumed a duty by actively controlling traffic for the march and thus had to exercise reasonable care | No duty exists: landowners/organizers do not owe a duty to control public road traffic; control of public ways is a governmental function | No cognizable duty as a matter of law; defendants not liable |
| Whether defendants voluntarily assumed a duty making them liable for negligent performance | Assumption of traffic control (stopping/waving traffic) created an assumed duty under Izen principles | Ferreira and related precedent preclude private assumption of traffic-control duties on public ways | Assumption-of-duty argument rejected; private parties can’t gratuitously assume traffic-control duty here |
| Whether any duty was extinguished by plaintiff’s conduct (Cummings’ refusal of help) | Refusal of help does not negate ongoing duty; question for jury whether waving traffic was breach/proximate cause | Cummings’ unequivocal refusal terminated any protective duty; traffic had been waved on before she entered the roadway | Court held any duty (if it had arisen) ended when walkers crossed and when Cummings refused assistance; no jury question remained |
| Whether jury verdict had sufficient legal basis | Jury could find negligence based on witnesses and conduct of traffic control | No legally sufficient basis absent a duty; verdict contrary to law | Judgment as a matter of law proper; jury verdict overturned |
Key Cases Cited
- Ferreira v. Strack, 636 A.2d 682 (R.I. 1994) (landowner does not owe duty to control traffic on adjacent public way; private assumption of traffic-control duties disfavored)
- Izen v. Winoker, 589 A.2d 824 (R.I. 1991) (one who voluntarily undertakes an act must perform it with reasonable care)
- Gushlaw v. Milner, 42 A.3d 1245 (R.I. 2012) (reaffirming Rhode Island approach to voluntary assumption of duty and declining broader Restatement §324A adoption)
- McGarry v. Pielech, 47 A.3d 271 (R.I. 2012) (standard of review for judgment as a matter of law is de novo; view evidence in light most favorable to nonmoving party)
- Willis v. Omar, 954 A.2d 126 (R.I. 2008) (duty is a threshold question in negligence actions; decided as a matter of law)