James v. State, 244 P.3d 542

James was convicted of lewd acts against a minor in 1979 and committed additional offenses in 1984, receiving a sentence with probation conditions but no explicit sex offender treatment requirement.
Before release on mandatory parole in 2005, the Parole Board imposed special conditions including sex offender treatment; James objected in writing, and the Board declined to modify.
After release, James missed a sex offender class and refused treatment; in December 2005, the Board revoked his parole and ordered ten years’ service.
In January 2006, James appealed the parole revocation and sought consolidation with his March 2005 appeal challenging the special conditions; the superior court denied consolidation.
The Alaska Court of Appeals reviews the Board’s decision de novo as to the legality of the special conditions, and reviews the denial of consolidation for abuse of discretion.
The court ultimately affirmed the superior court, holding the Board had authority to impose special conditions on mandatory parole and that the consolidation ruling was not an abuse of discretion.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the Parole Board had authority to impose special conditions on mandatory parole.	James contends the Board lacked authority.	Board has statutory authority to impose conditions on mandatory parole.	Yes, the Board had authority.
Whether the special conditions violate the ex post facto clauses.	Enactment of 1985 statute increases punishment for pre-1985 crimes.	Prior statutes already authorized similar conditions; 1985 statute does not increase punishment retroactively.	No ex post facto violation.
Whether the special conditions constitute double jeopardy.	Special conditions add punishment beyond original sentence.	Parole revocation is inherent in sentence enforcement; not a new punishment.	No double jeopardy violation.
Whether the Parole Board's actions violated the separation of powers.	Parole conditions should be judicially imposed.	Executive Parole Board may impose parole conditions.	No separation of powers violation.
Whether James’s privilege against self-incrimination was violated by the treatment requirements.	Treatment conditions could compel self-incriminating statements.	James was immunized for statements made during treatment.	Argument abandoned; even if preserved, immunity shields from incriminating risk.

Braham v. Beirne, 675 P.2d 1297 (Alaska App. 1984) (parole authority to impose special conditions on mandatory parolees)
Lapp v. State, 220 P.3d 534 (Alaska App. 2009) (ex post facto considerations in parole context)
Hill v. State, 22 P.3d 24 (Alaska App. 2001) (parole revocation and due process considerations)
Reyes v. State, 978 P.2d 635 (Alaska App. 1999) (double jeopardy considerations in parole context)
Lundy v. State, Dept. of Corr., 188 P.3d 692 (Alaska App. 2008) (separation of powers and administrative authority)
Gyles v. State, 901 P.2d 1143 (Alaska App. 1995) (privilege against self-incrimination and probation)