959 F.3d 873
8th Cir.2020Background
- Plaintiffs James Turntine and Promotional Services, a Missouri darts league operator, contracted with RedEye Rhino (Minnesota) in 2015 for exclusive jerseys and purchased $7,500 in Tournament vouchers to be awarded as prizes; some vouchers were not awarded and Promotional Services repurchased $2,500 worth.
- In 2016 Promotional Services required a $500 charity donation for apparel branding; RedEye Rhino declined and Turntine donated on its behalf; Defendants thereafter published disparaging Facebook posts and Promotional Services banned RedEye Rhino from future events.
- In 2018 Defendants posted a video and comments on Facebook accusing Turntine and Promotional Services of lying, manipulating, and engaging in underhanded business practices arising from the parties’ earlier dealings.
- Plaintiffs sued in Missouri state court for two counts of libel and one of slander seeking damages; Defendants removed to federal court on diversity grounds and moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction and failure to state a claim.
- The district court dismissed all counts, concluding the challenged statements were nonactionable opinion or otherwise not defamatory; the Eighth Circuit reversed, holding the complaint sufficiently pleaded actionable defamation and that the opinion privilege did not foreclose the claims at the pleading stage.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Subject-matter jurisdiction: amount in controversy | Damages pleaded “in excess of $20,000” per count and unspecified punitive damages do not show >$75,000 | Removing defendants argued aggregated and open-ended damages could reasonably exceed $75,000 | Court held diversity jurisdiction satisfied: a factfinder might award >$75,000 and removal burden met; not legally certain otherwise |
| Whether statements are capable of defamatory meaning | Statements calling plaintiffs liars/manipulators impute dishonesty and harm reputation | Statements were rhetorical, opinion, or non-factual responses to plaintiffs’ posts | Court held statements are capable of defamatory meaning (impute fraud/integrity issues) |
| Opinion privilege applicability | Statements imply verifiable facts about past business conduct and thus are not protected opinion | Statements are protected opinion and rhetorical hyperbole | Court held opinion privilege does not defeat the claims at pleading stage; reasonable factfinder could find implied factual assertions |
| Use of “innocent-construction” rule / proper Missouri law standard | District court erred by construing statements in their “most innocent sense” | Defendants relied on Missouri Court of Appeals precedent applying innocent-construction | Court held Missouri Supreme Court would not adopt innocent-construction post-Nazeri; court must ask only whether statements are capable of defamatory meaning and then whether any privilege applies |
Key Cases Cited
- Overcast v. Billings Mut. Ins., 11 S.W.3d 62 (Mo. 2000) (elements of defamation under Missouri law)
- Henry v. Halliburton, 690 S.W.2d 775 (Mo. 1985) (test whether statement is capable of defamatory meaning)
- Smith v. Humane Soc'y of U.S., 519 S.W.3d 789 (Mo. 2017) (opinion privilege does not apply if statement implies objective facts)
- Nazeri v. Mo. Valley Coll., 860 S.W.2d 303 (Mo. 1993) (abandoning rigid per se/per quod framework; unified analysis)
- Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1 (1990) (opinion vs. fact; statements implying false assertions of fact are actionable)
- Kopp v. Kopp, 280 F.3d 883 (8th Cir. 2002) (amount-in-controversy legal-certainty standard)
- Angus v. Shiley Inc., 989 F.2d 142 (3d Cir. 1993) (open-ended damages allegations valued by reasonable reading)
- Bell v. Hershey Co., 557 F.3d 953 (8th Cir. 2009) (removing party bears burden to prove jurisdictional threshold)
- Roe v. Michelin N. Am., Inc., 613 F.3d 1058 (11th Cir. 2010) (amount-in-controversy sometimes facially apparent)
- Anton v. St. Louis Suburban Newspapers, Inc., 598 S.W.2d 493 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980) (statements imputing dishonesty in professional character are defamatory)
