James Sweeney v. Kwame Raoul, 990 F.3d 555

Illinois law designates a union as exclusive representative for a bargaining unit and requires the union to fairly represent all unit employees, including nonmembers.
For years Illinois permitted "fair-share" (agency) fees for nonmembers; the Supreme Court in Janus v. AFSCME (2018) overruled Abood and held public unions cannot compel nonmembers to pay such fees.
International Union of Operating Engineers Local 150 represents ~3,300 municipal employees and says Janus leaves it obliged to represent nonmembers without a way to collect fees, creating a freerider problem and financial strain.
Local 150 sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in federal district court (naming the Illinois Attorney General and the Executive Director of the Illinois Labor Relations Board), arguing the fair-representation duty without fee authority violates the union’s First Amendment rights.
The district court granted summary judgment for defendants on the merits; the Seventh Circuit vacated and remanded with instructions to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, reasoning Local 150 lacked Article III standing and the dispute was unripe.
The Seventh Circuit emphasized the case presented an impermissible request for an advisory opinion because Local 150 alleged no concrete, particularized injury (no identified nonmember demand) and no credible, imminent threat of enforcement by the named state actors.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Standing — does Local 150 have Article III standing to sue now?	Janus made injury imminent: nonmembers stopped paying and will demand representation (freeriding).	No concrete, particularized injury; no identified nonmember has demanded representation; no enforcement threat by defendants.	No standing — injury speculative and not traceable to defendants; dismissal for lack of jurisdiction.
Ripeness / preenforcement challenge — may the union seek relief before any enforcement or demand?	Preenforcement relief appropriate because Janus created a new legal regime that imminently injures unions.	Premature: absence of threatened enforcement, absent a concrete dispute, and union intends to continue representing nonmembers.	Not ripe; preenforcement challenge improper without credible threat or specific conduct.
Merits — does the fair-representation duty, absent fee-collection, violate the union's First Amendment rights?	Duty compels association/speech by forcing the union to represent nonmembers for free.	Janus addressed compelled fees, not the representation scheme; precedent (Knight) allows exclusive representation rules.	Court did not reach the merits; question left open for a concrete case.

Janus v. AFSCME, 138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018) (held public-sector unions cannot compel nonmembers to pay fair-share fees)
Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (1977) (upheld fair-share fees prior to being overruled by Janus)
Minn. State Bd. for Cmty. Colls. v. Knight, 465 U.S. 271 (1984) (upheld exclusivity of representative systems against certain First Amendment challenges)
Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Americans United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464 (1982) (Article III case-or-controversy/standing principles)
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) (standing requires concrete and particularized injury traceable to defendant and redressable)
Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016) (concreteness requirement for injury-in-fact)
Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 573 U.S. 149 (2014) (preenforcement standing requires a credible threat of enforcement)
Babbitt v. United Farm Workers Nat'l Union, 442 U.S. 289 (1979) (preenforcement challenge doctrine: intent and credible threat required)
Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1 (2010) (standing and preenforcement considerations)
Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967) (ripeness—fitness of issues and hardship factors)
Blanchette v. Connecticut Gen. Ins. Corps., 419 U.S. 102 (1974) (ripeness is chiefly a question of timing)