James Sturgel v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.), 15A01-1607-CR-1509

Background

In 2014 the State charged James Sturgel with two counts of child molesting arising from alleged abuse of J.S., a child who had been in foster care with Deborah Chaney in 2006–2007.
J.S. reported multiple molestations in a 2011 forensic interview; the State’s case relied principally on J.S.’s testimony at trial.
The State sought to introduce evidence under Evid. R. 404(b) that Sturgel had admitted in 2008 to molesting a different five‑year‑old who had also been in Chaney’s care.
Sturgel moved in limine to exclude that evidence; the trial court initially granted the motion and repeatedly sustained objections during trial.
Late in the trial the court permitted testimony that Sturgel had admitted molesting the other child, limiting its use to the issue of “opportunity” and giving a limiting instruction.
Sturgel was convicted; on appeal he argued the admission of the prior‑act admission was an abuse of discretion under Evid. R. 404(b) and 403 and that the error was not harmless.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether evidence that Sturgel admitted molesting a different child was admissible under Evid. R. 404(b) for a non‑propensity purpose (opportunity)	The State: prior admission shows Sturgel had opportunity in Chaney’s home and rebuts impression that others’ presence made molestation impossible	Sturgel: admission was impermissible propensity evidence and its prejudicial effect outweighed any probative value	Court reversed: admission was an abuse of discretion — marginal relevance to opportunity and undue prejudice from identifying Sturgel as the prior molester
Whether the trial court properly balanced probative value against unfair prejudice under Evid. R. 403	The State: limiting instruction and narrow questioning mitigated prejudice; evidence bore on credibility of foster parent’s testimony about supervision	Sturgel: naming him and the similar‑aged victim injected unnecessary inflammatory detail creating forbidden inference	Court: trial court’s Rule 403 balancing was flawed; prejudice substantially outweighed probative value
Whether Sturgel “opened the door” to the prior‑act evidence	The State: defense statements and questioning (e.g., suggesting molestation could not have occurred; asking whether Chaney saw tickling) created a misleading impression that justified corrective evidence	Sturgel: his remarks did not create a deceptively incomplete or false impression that would justify admitting the prior admission	Court: rejected State’s "opened the door" argument — defense did not create the kind of misleading impression that warranted the evidence
Whether the erroneous admission was harmless	The State: there was sufficient evidence for conviction and limiting instruction reduced harm	Sturgel: conviction rested largely on J.S.’s testimony and the prior‑act admission likely affected the jury	Court: error was not harmless — only independent evidence was J.S.’s testimony and jury asked about Sturgel’s arrest history, so reversal required

Key Cases Cited

Pierce v. State, 29 N.E.3d 1258 (Ind. 2015) (appellate review of trial court evidentiary discretion)
Wilson v. State, 765 N.E.2d 1265 (Ind. 2002) (two‑part test for admissibility of other‑acts evidence under Evid. R. 404(b))
Ortiz v. State, 716 N.E.2d 345 (Ind. 1999) (application of relevance and Rule 403 balancing to other‑acts evidence)
Hall v. State, 36 N.E.3d 459 (Ind. 2015) (doctrine that a party may "open the door" to otherwise inadmissible evidence when a deceptive impression is created)
Wickizer v. State, 626 N.E.2d 795 (Ind. 1993) (warning against admission of evidence that creates a forbidden inference and is unduly inflammatory)